Are Pharmaceutical Stocks Halal? Screening Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, Pfizer, and the Big Pharma Names (2026)
Thirteen of the seventeen drug makers this site has screened pass the Shariah screen — and the four that fail do so in four different ways. Eli Lilly passes with debt of 5.0% of its market capitalisation and net interest expense. Novo Nordisk passes at 12.0% debt and 0.41% interest income. Pfizer fails at 39.43% debt, largely the roughly $43B Seagen acquisition. Amgen fails despite passing both ratios — fail-closed on a third-party classification. And Bausch Health, the Canadian name in this guide, fails with debt of about 962% of its market capitalisation. This guide works through the business gate and its genuinely debated gray areas, the GLP-1 boom that made two of these companies household names, every drug-maker screener result on the site, the acquisition-debt pattern that fails the big losers, and the checklist a Canadian investor should run before buying.
Updated November 2026 · 19-minute read · Reviewed by the Canadian Halal Investor team
Why pharma raises a Shariah question at all
Pharmaceutical stocks are a core holding for many investors — a large, defensive sector that pays dividends, funds retirements, and sits in almost every broad-market fund. They are also the sector where the halal question arrives in its most confusing form, because the question is rarely just about the numbers. An investor asking "is Pfizer halal?" is usually asking three things at once: is making medicines a permissible business, does the company's balance sheet clear the financial gates, and what about the ingredients — the porcine-derived gelatin, the alcohol excipients, the contraceptives? The screen answers them in order, and the answers are different for different companies. Eli Lilly and Pfizer are both drug makers, both sell prescription medicines, and they land on opposite sides of the screen. The difference is not the medicine. It is the balance sheet.
The question has also become louder in the last two years for a reason that has nothing to do with screening: the GLP-1 drugs. Novo Nordisk's Ozempic and Wegovy and Eli Lilly's Mounjaro and Zepbound turned two drug makers into two of the most talked-about companies in the world, and the attention pulled their screeners with it — the site's Eli Lilly screener is one of its ten most-visited pages. Our news piece on Eli Lilly's GLP-1 earnings surge covers the business story; this guide covers the screen. The two are related but not the same: a drug class can be a commercial phenomenon and still raise no gate-one question at all, and a company can pass every gate while its best-selling medicine remains a separate personal question for the person taking it.
There is a Canadian edge, too, and it is sharper here than in most sectors. Canada has no domestic drug maker of scale — the companies Canadians actually buy in this sector are American and European names trading in New York and on Nasdaq, plus one Canadian company, Bausch Health, listed in Toronto. A Canadian halal investor who wants pharma exposure is choosing between a US-listed giant, a European-listed giant, or the one Toronto-listed name — and each of those choices screens differently, taxes differently by account, and carries a different concentration risk. The rest of this guide takes them in turn.
One more framing point before the gates. A pharma stock is a share in a company, screened like any other industrial stock: first its business, then its financial ratios. Nothing about the medicine changes the test. A company that makes cancer drugs and a company that makes diabetes drugs face the identical two gates, and the results in the table below prove it: the two GLP-1 leaders both pass, and two of their oldest competitors fail. If the drug decided the result, the table would look the other way around.
Gate one: is making medicines a prohibited business?
Every screener on this site applies the same two-gate screen, using the 33%/33%/5% thresholds of the Dow Jones Islamic / S&P Shariah convention. Gate one looks at what the company does. A company fails it if its core business is in an industry widely considered non-compliant under AAOIFI-style screening: conventional financial services, alcohol production and distribution, gambling and casinos, pork production and processing, adult entertainment, conventional weapons manufacturing, tobacco production, and derivatives and speculative trading venues.
Making medicines is not on that list. Neither is making vaccines, selling prescription drugs, running clinical trials, or manufacturing animal-health products. The methodology assesses what the company actually does — its revenue-generating operations as disclosed in its own filings — not just its industry label. On that basis, every drug maker in this guide clears gate one, including the ones that fail overall: the Pfizer screener, the Bristol-Myers Squibb screener and the Amgen screener all record the business as passing, and their results turn on the ratios — or, in Amgen's case, on a third-party classification — rather than the industry. The same holds for the animal-health name in the table: Zoetis makes medicines for animals, not people, and that raises no gate-one question either.
Two gray areas sit on the boundary, and each is worth naming before the ratios, because they are the questions investors actually ask and the screen does not settle them. The first is ingredients. Some medicines use porcine-derived ingredients — gelatin in capsules, heparin — and some use alcohol as a solvent or excipient. Scholars differ on these: one view permits such medicines under necessity (darura) when no halal alternative exists, and treats trace excipients differently from a porcine product consumed as such; another view requires avoidance wherever an alternative exists. The screen this site applies does not test for ingredient-level sourcing. It tests business segments and financial ratios, and no drug maker in this guide fails on ingredients. That means a PASS result does not answer the ingredient question — it is a separate question, best taken to a qualified scholar with the specific medicine named. See our Ask a Scholar page.
The second gray area is what a drug maker sells beyond prescription medicines. Several of the companies in this guide sell contraceptives, and one sells cannabis-derived medicines; others sell consumer-health products, infant formula, or medical devices alongside their prescription drugs. Whether any of those product lines changes the gate-one answer is a question the screen notes rather than settles — the business gate looks at the company's core segments, and a small product line inside a large prescription-drug business does not reclassify the company. The same applies to the moral screen, which is a separate check from the business gate: it looks for documented business ties to the Israeli military, the US military, and weapons manufacturing. Neither the moral screen nor the BDS screen currently publishes findings on any of the drug makers in this guide. That is a statement about what has been published, not a clean bill of health, and the business gate and the moral screen are separate checks — neither substitutes for the other.
Scholars disagree on the wider questions this raises, and this page reports the disagreement rather than settling it. The debate that touches pharma most directly is the ingredient question above, and next to it the threshold question: the roughly 33% balance-sheet ceilings and the roughly 5% income ceiling this site uses are the Dow Jones Islamic / S&P Shariah convention, while AAOIFI's own standard uses 30% for the balance-sheet ratios — and the Amgen case in this guide turns on exactly that difference in conventions. There is no published fatwa specific to pharmaceutical stocks that this site can cite as settling the matter, and none is claimed here. The screen's result is a methodology output; your decision is your own, and a qualified scholar is the right person to take it to.
The GLP-1 boom: what it does — and does not — change
The GLP-1 class — Novo Nordisk's Ozempic and Wegovy, Eli Lilly's Mounjaro and Zepbound — is the reason pharma is the most-searched sector on this site right now, and it is worth being precise about what the boom does and does not change for a halal investor. What it changes is attention and scale: two companies that were once known mainly to diabetes specialists are now household names, their share prices reflect a growth story the rest of the sector does not have, and their screeners are among the most-read pages on the site. What it does not change is the screen. GLP-1 medicines are prescription drugs for diabetes and obesity, and prescription medicines are not on the screen's list of prohibited businesses, so the drug class raises no gate-one question for either company. Both pass the financial gates as well: Novo Nordisk at 12.0% debt and 0.41% interest income, Eli Lilly at 5.0% debt as a net interest payer. The boom is a commercial fact; the screen is a separate measurement, and the two do not interfere with each other.
The concentration is the thing to watch, not the compliance. An investor buying either GLP-1 leader is buying a company whose investor story is dominated by a single drug class, and a single drug class is a single point of failure: a safety signal, a pricing decision, a competitor's better molecule, or a patent challenge can move the story faster than a diversified portfolio of medicines would. The screen does not measure that concentration — it measures business activity and balance-sheet ratios — so a PASS on Novo Nordisk or Eli Lilly is not a judgment that the GLP-1 bet is a good one. It is a judgment that the company clears the two gates on its screening date. Our news piece on Eli Lilly's GLP-1 earnings surge covers the business momentum; the screeners cover the compliance; neither substitutes for the other.
There is also a personal question hiding inside the investment question, and it deserves to be separated cleanly. Whether taking a GLP-1 medicine is right for you is a medical question for your doctor and a personal one for a qualified scholar — it turns on your health, the alternatives available to you, and the ingredient and necessity questions discussed above. None of that is answered by a stock screen, and a PASS on the company is not an endorsement of the drug. The two questions — what you take and what you own shares in — are different questions, answered by different people, and this site answers only the second.
What the screeners actually say: every drug maker on this site
The screeners tell a consistent story: the business is rarely the problem, the leverage is. Here is every drug maker this site has screened, with the result and the reason. Screened between September 29 and October 2, 2026; figures are from each company's screener page on its screening date.
| Company | Listing | Result | Why |
|---|---|---|---|
| Eli Lilly | NYSE: LLY | PASS | Debt 5.0% of market cap; net interest expense — it pays interest on its borrowings rather than earning it. Diabetes, obesity, oncology, immunology, neuroscience. |
| Novo Nordisk | NYSE: NVO | PASS | Debt 12.0% of ~$171B market cap; interest income 0.41% of revenue. The other GLP-1 leader. |
| Johnson & Johnson | NYSE: JNJ | PASS | Debt 7.69% of market cap; interest income 0.91% of revenue. Prescription medicines and medical technology. |
| Merck | NYSE: MRK | PASS | Debt ~13.9% of market cap; interest income ~0.53% of revenue. |
| AstraZeneca | NASDAQ: AZN | PASS | Debt 11.1% of market cap; finance income 0.61% of revenue. |
| AbbVie | NYSE: ABBV | PASS | Debt ~14.3% of market cap; interest income ~0.43% of revenue. |
| Gilead Sciences | NASDAQ: GILD | PASS | Debt $24,936M ≈ 13.62% of ~$183.11B market cap; interest income $349M ≈ 1.19% of revenue. |
| Vertex Pharmaceuticals | NASDAQ: VRTX | PASS | Debt 0.00% of ~$133.1B market cap — no interest-bearing debt at all. Interest income $490.9M is 4.09% of FY2025 revenue — the closest PASS to the income ceiling in this guide. |
| Novartis | NYSE: NVS | PASS | Debt 12.5% of market cap; interest income 0.68% of revenue. |
| Sanofi | NASDAQ: SNY | PASS | Debt 24.2% of market cap; interest income 0.68% of revenue. |
| Biogen | NASDAQ: BIIB | PASS | Debt $8.1B ~24% of ~$33B market cap; interest income 1.3% of revenue. |
| Regeneron | NASDAQ: REGN | PASS | Debt ~3.5% of market cap — among the lowest debt ratios in this guide. |
| Zoetis | NYSE: ZTS | PASS | Animal health, not human drugs. Debt $9.05B ≈ 31.02% of ~$29.2B market cap — the closest PASS to the debt ceiling in this guide. |
| Pfizer | NYSE: PFE | FAIL | Debt 39.43% of ~$160.3B market cap, largely the ~$43B Seagen acquisition (December 2023). Income gate passes at 1.07% — the failure is at the debt gate alone. |
| Amgen | NASDAQ: AMGN | FAIL | Ratios pass (debt 24.19%, income 1.11%) — fails fail-closed: Musaffa classifies it NOT HALAL (September 2026, AAOIFI); Zoya rates it compliant. |
| Bristol-Myers Squibb | NYSE: BMY | FAIL | Debt 33.38% of ~$129.2B market cap — just over the ceiling. Income gate passes at 0.62%. Largely the $74B Celgene deal. |
| Bausch Health | TSX/NYSE: BHC | FAIL | The Canadian name. Debt ~US$20,741M ≈ 962% of its ~US$2.16B market cap — the debt is nearly ten times the company's value. |
Three patterns are visible at a glance. The first is that thirteen of seventeen pass, and most pass comfortably: ten of the thirteen carry debt below 15% of market capitalisation, and the two GLP-1 leaders are among the cleanest names on the page. Pharma, as a sector, is not a borderline case the way automakers are. The second pattern is that the failures are not close calls, except one: Pfizer at 39.43% and Bausch Health at about 962% are failures by a wide margin, while Bristol-Myers Squibb at 33.38% is the only failure decided by less than a percentage point — a falling share price or a single debt paydown could move it either way. The third pattern is the Canadian one. Bausch Health is the only Canadian drug maker of scale in the table, and it is the worst result on the page by an order of magnitude. A Canadian halal investor who wants pharma exposure is, in practice, buying American or European names.
The table also shows what the screen does not do. It does not rank companies by how good their drugs are, how large they are, or how well they are run. Pfizer is one of the largest drug makers in the world and it fails; Regeneron is far smaller and it passes with one of the lowest debt ratios in the guide. The screen measures two things — what the company does, and what its balance sheet looks like — and nothing else. An investor who wants a judgment on the medicines themselves, on the GLP-1 race, or on which company will win the next decade will not find it here, because the screen is not that judgment.
One adjacent group is worth a sentence, because it sits on the same sector page and confuses the same searches. The drug distributors — Cencora, Cardinal Health and McKesson — all pass: they move medicines rather than making them, and their debt ratios are low. CVS Health fails, with $61.4B of interest-bearing debt at 54.7% of its roughly $112.35B market capitalisation — a pharmacy and insurer whose leverage, not its shelves, decides the result. Distributors are a different business from drug makers, and the healthcare sector page lists every screened name in the sector in one place, makers and distributors alike.
The acquisition-debt pattern: how big pharma fails
Gate two looks at the finances: interest-bearing debt at or below about 33% of market capitalisation, cash and equivalents at or below about 33%, and non-compliant income at or below about 5% of total revenue. The thresholds are approximations — "about 33%" — because market capitalisations move daily and accounting classifications vary. The full standard is documented on our methodology page. For drug makers, gate two is where the story is, because the debt that fails them is not operating debt. It is acquisition debt.
Start with Pfizer, the clearest case. Per its Q2 2026 10-Q, at June 28, 2026, Pfizer's total interest-bearing debt was $63,194M — short-term borrowings including the current portion of long-term debt of $2,699M plus long-term debt of $60,495M — against a market capitalisation of about $160.3B, which puts the debt ratio at about 39.43%, above the roughly 33% ceiling. The debt load stems largely from the December 2023 Seagen acquisition at about $43B, which roughly doubled long-term debt from about $31.7B to about $61.4B. The drug business itself is not the source of the failure: the business gate passes, and interest and investment income of 1.07% of FY2025 revenue passes the income gate too. The failure is the price paid for growth, borrowed and still sitting on the balance sheet.
Bristol-Myers Squibb is the same shape at a smaller scale, and the closest call in this guide. Per its Q2 2026 10-Q, at June 30, 2026, short-term debt obligations of $1,027M and long-term debt of $42,093M total $43,120M, which is 33.38% of its roughly $129.2B market capitalisation — above the roughly 33% ceiling by less than half a percentage point. The debt is largely from its acquisition history, including the $74B Celgene deal, and it has been declining — about $45.1B at year-end 2025 — but it still sits above the ceiling. Interest income of $300M is only 0.62% of FY2025 revenue, so the income gate passes. Unlike Pfizer, this is a failure that a single quarter could reverse: a debt paydown, or a rising share price lifting the market-capitalisation denominator, would pull it back inside the ceiling without any change in the business.
Bausch Health is the same pattern taken to its extreme, and the Canadian name in the guide. Its debt of about US$20,741 million is roughly 962% of its roughly US$2.16B market capitalisation — the debt is nearly ten times the company's value. That ratio is not a story about a single acquisition. It is a story about a market capitalisation that has collapsed while the debt stayed where it was: the debt ratio is debt divided by market capitalisation, so when the denominator falls, the ratio explodes even if the company borrows nothing new. A drug maker whose share price falls far enough fails the screen on arithmetic alone, and Bausch Health is the proof. No debt paydown on a realistic scale closes a gap measured in multiples of the company's entire value.
The pattern is worth stating plainly because it generalises beyond pharma. Any company that grows by buying other companies with borrowed money carries the purchase price on its balance sheet, and the screen measures the consolidated company an investor actually buys against the same ceilings as a company that grew organically. A drug maker that buys its pipeline fails where a drug maker that builds its pipeline passes — not because buying is impermissible, but because borrowing to buy is leverage, and leverage is what gate two measures. That is not a judgment that acquisitions are a bad strategy. It is a measurement of the company an investor actually owns shares in.
Amgen: the fail-closed case
Amgen deserves its own section, because it is the one name in this guide where the screen's own numbers say pass and the published result says fail — and understanding why is understanding how this site handles disagreement. Per Amgen's FY2025 10-K, total GAAP debt was $54,604M — a current portion of $4,599M plus long-term debt of $50,005M — against a market capitalisation of about $225.8B, which puts the debt ratio at about 24.19%, below the roughly 33% ceiling, though the highest debt ratio among the recent US-expansion passes. Cash and cash equivalents of $9,129M are about 4.04% of market capitalisation. Interest income on interest-bearing investments of $408M is about 1.11% of FY2025 revenue of $36,751M, below the roughly 5% ceiling. On the two gates as this site measures them, Amgen passes.
But Musaffa classifies Amgen as NOT HALAL as of September 2026 under its AAOIFI methodology, and it also appears as not halal on Musaffa's April 2026 Nasdaq-100 list — while Zoya rates Amgen Shariah-compliant. Musaffa's page does not state its reason, so no cause can be confirmed. A factual candidate explanation is that on an assets-based screen, Amgen's total debt divided by total assets is 60.3% — far above a 30% threshold — though this is a hypothesis, not a confirmed cause. The AAOIFI convention measures debt against total assets where this site's convention measures it against market capitalisation, and the two denominators give different answers for the same company. The site's choice, when two established screeners disagree and one says not halal, is to publish fail-closed rather than as a clean pass.
That choice is a policy, not a measurement, and it is worth naming as one. A fail-closed publication does not claim Amgen's ratios fail; it claims the disagreement is material enough that a clean PASS would mislead. An investor who follows Zoya will read the same company differently from an investor who follows Musaffa, and both are reading honest screens — they are applying different conventions to the same filings. The practical consequence is the one stated in the table: Amgen is listed as FAIL on this site, with the reason given, so that an investor who checks only the result does not mistake it for a ratio failure, and an investor who reads the reason can make their own judgment. When the screeners agree again, the result can be revisited — and until then, the disagreement is the finding.
The borderline passes: Vertex, Zoetis, Sanofi, Biogen
Not every PASS in the table is equally comfortable, and the uncomfortable ones are where re-screening matters most. Four names sit close enough to a ceiling that a single quarter could change the answer, and each sits close for a different reason.
Vertex is the closest to the income ceiling. Its Q2 2026 balance sheet carries no short-term or long-term interest-bearing debt at all, so debt divided by market capitalisation is 0.00% against the roughly 33% ceiling — the cleanest debt position in this guide. But FY2025 interest income of $490.9M is 4.09% of FY2025 revenue of $12,001.3M, against a roughly 5% ceiling. The irony is structural: a debt-free company with a large cash pile earns interest on the cash, and a company whose revenue is small relative to its cash pile divides that interest income by a small number. A shrinking revenue denominator or a growing cash pile could push Vertex across the income ceiling without the company borrowing a dollar. It is the mirror image of the acquisition-debt failures: the balance sheet is clean, and the income statement is where the risk sits.
Zoetis is the closest to the debt ceiling. Its debt of $9.05B is about 31.02% of its roughly $29.2B market capitalisation — inside the roughly 33% ceiling, but by less than two percentage points. A debt-funded acquisition, a buyback funded with borrowing, or a falling share price could push it across the line, and a rising share price or a debt paydown would widen the margin. Sanofi, at 24.2% debt, and Biogen, at about 24% debt against a roughly $33B market capitalisation, are the next tier: not as close as Zoetis, but close enough that the direction of travel matters more than the level. The parts of this guide that age fastest are these four rows, and they are the rows to re-check before adding to a position.
The pattern generalises, and it is the same one the automaker guide found at Magna: the names closest to a ceiling are the ones where the next quarter's numbers actually matter, while the names far from a ceiling — Eli Lilly at 5.0% debt, Regeneron at about 3.5% — are stable results that a single quarter is unlikely to reverse. A PASS is a dated measurement, not a permanent status, and the distance to the ceiling is the measure of how dated it can afford to get. For more on what happens when a PASS holding turns FAIL, see our guide on when a halal stock fails the screen.
Pharma ETFs: screen the holdings, not the label
For many investors the natural response to a sector with thirteen passing names and four failing ones is to buy the basket instead: a healthcare or pharma ETF. The instinct is reasonable and the execution needs care, because a fund does not inherit a screen result from its theme. A healthcare fund is a basket of drug makers, device companies, distributors, insurers and biotech startups — and a basket that contains several FAIL names does not become compliant because the label on the tin says "healthcare."
The method is the one in our guide on how to check a fund's holdings for halal compliance: pull the fund's published holdings list, screen the largest positions one by one against the two gates, and judge the fund on its holdings. In practice that means checking whether the fund's biggest weights are the passing names — Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, Johnson & Johnson — or a spread that includes Pfizer, Amgen, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Bausch Health. A fund dominated by the passing names is a different proposition from a fund spread evenly across the four FAIL names and the unscreened field, and the holdings list is the only way to tell them apart. Our halal ETF comparison covers the screened equity funds in the same way.
Two further cautions. First, fund holdings change: a quarterly rebalance can swap a passing name for a failing one, so the check is not one-and-done. Second, the theme itself is slippery: one fund's "healthcare" is drug makers, another's is device companies, a third's is insurers, and a fourth's is biotech startups — four different baskets under one label, each needing the same holdings-level check. If the fund's holdings list is not something you can read and screen in an evening, that is itself information. And the same warning from the sector guides applies here: a fund that holds a PASS name and a FAIL name is not half-compliant. It holds a FAIL name.
The Canadian investor's checklist
Before buying any pharma stock, run this checklist — it takes minutes and it catches the mistakes that cost money:
- Check the screen result. Look the ticker up on this site first. Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, Johnson & Johnson, Merck and nine more pass; Pfizer, Amgen, Bristol-Myers Squibb and Bausch Health fail. If the name has not been screened — Roche has not — run the two gates yourself from its latest statements, and check the company behind the ticker before you trust any result you find. Our healthcare sector page lists every screened name in the sector in one place.
- Check the listing and the account. Most big drug makers are US- or European-listed; Bausch Health is the Canadian name trading in Toronto. US-listed names carry different withholding-tax treatment by account — the US withholding rate is 15% inside a TFSA and treaty-exempt inside an RRSP — so the same share can have a different after-tax outcome depending on where you hold it. Our asset-location guide works through TFSA, RRSP, and non-registered placement in full.
- Plan the purification. Unlike Tesla, which pays no dividend, most passing drug makers pay one — Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, AbbVie and Novartis all pay dividends — so a small impure share of each dividend needs purifying every year. Our purification how-to shows the exact math, and our zakat-on-stocks guide covers the separate zakat obligation.
- Size the position for a one-theme sector. Thirteen passing drug makers is a menu, not a portfolio. Decide in advance what share of your portfolio one sector should be, and write it down before you buy — not after it doubles. A GLP-1 leader, a diversified giant and a biotech startup are three versions of the same pharma bet, and they tend to move together when the theme moves.
- Set the re-screening reminder. Screen results are dated. The figures in this guide are from screenings run between September 29 and October 2, 2026; a new debt issue, an acquisition, or a revenue shock can move a ratio across a ceiling. Re-check the screener before adding to a position, and at least annually for anything you hold. Zoetis, at 31.02% against a roughly 33% ceiling, and Vertex, at 4.09% against a roughly 5% ceiling, are the names where a single quarter could change the answer.
- Keep the medicine-is-not-the-company distinction straight. The screen judges the company, not the drug. A FAIL on Pfizer is not a ruling on whether taking a Pfizer medicine is permissible, and a PASS on Eli Lilly is not an endorsement of any GLP-1 drug. The two questions — what you take and what you own shares in — are different questions, answered by different people, and this site answers only the second.
What to watch next
Three things would change this guide. The first is the unscreened names: a Roche screening would fill the biggest gap on this page, and the result could go either way — Roche's own debt and income ratios will decide it. Until that screening exists, the honest entry in the table is "not yet screened," and this guide will be updated when it is.
The second is the borderline names. Zoetis at 31.02% debt, Vertex at 4.09% interest income, Sanofi at 24.2% debt and Biogen at about 24% are the rows where the next quarter's numbers actually matter — and Bristol-Myers Squibb, at 33.38%, is the FAIL where the same logic runs in reverse: a debt paydown or a rising share price could pull it back inside the ceiling without any change in its business. The direction of travel matters more than the level, and the next set of filings is the event to watch.
The third is the acquisition cycle. Pfizer's Seagen debt and Bristol-Myers Squibb's Celgene debt are the two largest single reasons for failure in this guide, and the next large pharma deal will test the same gate again: a debt-funded acquisition pushes the buyer's ratio up on the day it closes, and a buyer that is currently passing can fail on the announcement. Short of a deleveraging, the failing names' results are stable: the debt is structural, the ceiling is fixed, and in Bausch Health's case the gap is measured in multiples of the company's entire value.
Pharma stocks, screened properly, are a broad opportunity: thirteen passing drug makers, four failing ones whose failures are structural or methodological, and a field of unscreened names led by Roche. That breadth is itself the finding. A halal investor who wants pharma exposure can get it — through Eli Lilly or Novo Nordisk, with the GLP-1 concentration noted and purification planned on the dividend, or through any of the other eleven passing names — but the sector rewards the screen: the same theme, bought through Pfizer instead of Eli Lilly, is a different investment entirely. Buy the screen result, not the theme.
FAQ
Are pharmaceutical stocks halal?
As a business activity, yes: making and selling prescription medicines is not on the list of prohibited businesses this site's screen applies, and no drug maker in this guide fails the business gate. Whether a specific pharma stock passes depends on the financial gates. Thirteen of the seventeen drug makers this site has screened pass — including Eli Lilly, Novo Nordisk, Johnson & Johnson and Merck — while four fail: Pfizer and Bristol-Myers Squibb on debt, Amgen fail-closed on a third-party classification despite passing both ratios, and Bausch Health on debt of about 962% of its market capitalisation. This is a screening result, not a fatwa.
Why does Pfizer fail when Eli Lilly passes?
The difference is not the medicines — it is the balance sheet. Pfizer's interest-bearing debt of $63,194M is about 39.43% of its roughly $160.3B market capitalisation, above the roughly 33% ceiling, and the debt is largely the December 2023 Seagen acquisition at about $43B, which roughly doubled its long-term debt. Its interest income of 1.07% of revenue passes the roughly 5% income ceiling, so the failure is at the debt gate alone. Eli Lilly, by contrast, carries debt of 5.0% of its market capitalisation and reports net interest expense — it pays interest on its borrowings rather than earning it. Same industry, same business gate, opposite results: the acquisition debt is what separates them.
Why does Amgen fail if its debt and income ratios pass?
Amgen is the one name in this guide where the ratios and the result disagree, and the disagreement is the point. Per its FY2025 10-K, Amgen's total GAAP debt of $54,604M is about 24.19% of its roughly $225.8B market capitalisation — below the roughly 33% ceiling — and its interest income of $408M is about 1.11% of FY2025 revenue, below the roughly 5% ceiling. On the numbers alone it would pass. But Musaffa classifies Amgen as NOT HALAL as of September 2026 under its AAOIFI methodology, while Zoya rates it Shariah-compliant, and this site publishes Amgen fail-closed rather than as a clean pass. A factual candidate explanation is that on an assets-based screen Amgen's total debt divided by total assets is 60.3%, far above a 30% threshold — though Musaffa's page does not state its reason, so this is a hypothesis, not a confirmed cause. When two established screeners disagree and one says not halal, the conservative publication choice is FAIL.
Are GLP-1 weight-loss drugs like Ozempic and Mounjaro halal to invest in?
The screen judges the company, not the medicine, and that distinction matters here. GLP-1 medicines — Novo Nordisk's Ozempic and Wegovy, Eli Lilly's Mounjaro and Zepbound — are prescription drugs for diabetes and obesity, and prescription medicines are not on the screen's list of prohibited businesses, so the drug class itself raises no gate-one question for either company. Both companies pass the financial gates as well: Novo Nordisk at 12.0% debt and 0.41% interest income, Eli Lilly at 5.0% debt as a net interest payer. Whether taking a GLP-1 medicine is right for you is a different question — a medical one for your doctor and a personal one for a qualified scholar — and it is not answered by a stock screen. A PASS on the company is not an endorsement of the drug, and a question about the drug is not a question about the share.
What about medicines made with porcine ingredients or alcohol?
This is the most genuinely debated question in pharma screening, and scholars differ on it, so this page reports the disagreement rather than settling it. Some medicines use porcine-derived ingredients — gelatin in capsules, heparin — and some use alcohol as a solvent or excipient. One view permits such medicines under necessity (darura) when no halal alternative exists, and treats trace excipients differently from a porcine product consumed as such; another view requires avoidance wherever an alternative exists. The screen this site applies does not test for ingredient-level sourcing: it tests the company's business segments and its financial ratios, and no drug maker in this guide fails on ingredients. That means the ingredient question is not answered by a PASS result — it is a separate question to take to a qualified scholar, ideally with the specific medicine named. See our Ask a Scholar page.
What should a Canadian investor check before buying a pharma stock?
Four things. First, the screen result on this site — or run the two gates yourself if the name has not been screened, as Roche has not. Second, the listing: most big drug makers are US- or European-listed, while Bausch Health is the Canadian name trading in Toronto; US-listed names carry different withholding-tax treatment by account — 15% inside a TFSA, treaty-exempt inside an RRSP. Third, purification: unlike Tesla, most passing drug makers pay dividends — Eli Lilly, Johnson & Johnson, Merck, AbbVie and Novartis all pay one — so a small impure share of each dividend needs purifying every year. Fourth, re-screening: a PASS can turn FAIL when financials change, so check the screener again before adding to a position — Zoetis, at 31.02% debt against a roughly 33% ceiling, and Vertex, at 4.09% interest income against a roughly 5% ceiling, are the names where that matters most.