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Airbnb Surged 12% on a Blowout Quarter — but It Still Fails the Halal Screen (2026)

Berkshire Hathaway reported third-quarter results at 8 a.m. on Saturday 7 November 2026, and the release carried the two numbers that define the Greg Abel era so far: operating earnings of $12.705 billion, down 5.8 percent from a year earlier, and share repurchases of $9.6 billion, the largest single quarter of buybacks in the company's history. Net earnings fell 28 percent to $22.112 billion as investment gains shrank to $9.407 billion from $17.3 billion, and the cash pile grew to a record $377.4 billion. The Class B shares closed Friday at $570.89, down 0.25 percent on the day but up 13.6 percent for the year, after touching a record close of $579.09 on Wednesday. None of it changes the screen: Berkshire still fails this site's Shariah screen at gate one, because conventional insurance and reinsurance are a prohibited business activity — and this quarter, the one the screener page said to wait for, confirms the fail rather than lifting it. This article reads the quarter the way a halal investor should read it: what the numbers actually said, why the buyback matters and why it does not, what the screen says, and why a gate-one fail is a different kind of fail from the ones this earnings season has produced.

Updated November 2026 · Reviewed by the Canadian Halal Investor team

What Berkshire actually reported

The print, in full. Berkshire's news release, filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission alongside its quarterly Form 10-Q, reported operating earnings of $12,705 million for the quarter ended 30 September 2026, down 5.8 percent from $13,485 million a year earlier. Operating earnings per Class A share were $8,907, against an average forecast of $8,821.84 from four analysts surveyed by FactSet, so the operating result beat expectations by a small margin even as it fell year over year. Operating earnings are the number Berkshire itself tells investors to watch, because they exclude gains and losses on the stock portfolio, which swing with the market and say little about the businesses. Net earnings, which include those gains and losses, fell 28 percent to $22,112 million, or $15,502 per Class A share, from $30,796 million a year earlier, because investment gains shrank to $9,407 million from $17.3 billion. Revenue was $105.6 billion, up about 11 percent year over year and ahead of the roughly $102 billion expected by Visible Alpha.

This was the third quarter since Greg Abel became chief executive in January 2026, when Warren Buffett handed over the role he had held for six decades, and the release is the first full look at the Abel-era capital allocation in a single quarter: a record buyback, two large acquisitions now inside the numbers, and a cash pile that kept growing despite both. The shares did not trade on the release — it came out on a Saturday morning, when markets are closed — so the market's verdict arrives on Monday. The setup going into it: the Class B shares closed Friday at $570.89, down 0.25 percent on the day, after a record close of $579.09 on Wednesday, and they are up 13.6 percent so far in 2026, against about 7.8 percent for the S&P 500. The market around them was split on Friday: the Nasdaq Composite rose 1.09 percent to 24,579.42 and the S&P 500 rose 0.31 percent to 7,376.86, while the Dow Jones Industrial Average fell 0.46 percent to 51,285.73, after Thursday's rout in which the S&P 500 fell 4.36 percent. For the week, the S&P 500 fell 2.68 percent, the Nasdaq fell 3.37 percent and the Dow fell 0.94 percent, so Berkshire's release lands after the worst week for United States stocks since June.

One line in the release deserves quoting in full, because it is a discipline the rest of this article follows: Berkshire said the summary in its press release "is not adequate for making an informed investment judgment" and pointed readers to the full quarterly filing. That is the right standard for every number in this article. The figures below are the reported headline numbers; the 10-Q carries the segment detail, and the screener refresh that follows it will be measured on the filed figures, not on the press release.

The buyback: the biggest in Berkshire's history

The buyback is the story of the quarter. Berkshire repurchased about $9.6 billion of its own shares in the third quarter, more than double the $4.5 billion it bought back in the second quarter, and the largest single-quarter buyback in the company's history. The first quarter of 2026, by contrast, saw only $234 million of repurchases. The nine-month total now stands at about $14.4 billion. Reuters reported that Berkshire bought about $2 billion more in the first four weeks of October. The scale surprised the market: Visible Alpha's estimate for the quarter had been $1.6 billion, so the actual figure was six times the expected number.

The acceleration is an Abel-era signature. Under Buffett, buybacks were sporadic and price-sensitive, governed by a rule that Berkshire would only repurchase when the shares traded below its estimate of intrinsic value and when cash, cash equivalents and Treasury bills would stay above $30 billion after the purchase. That second condition still applies — the programme bars buybacks that would cut the cash pile below $30 billion, a threshold the current pile clears by more than ten times over. What has changed is the pace: $234 million, then $4.5 billion, then $9.6 billion, a staircase that reads as a new chief executive deciding, quarter by quarter, that Berkshire's own shares are among the best assets available for its cash. Reuters put it the same way, reporting that Berkshire accelerated repurchases after finding its own shares among the best assets to invest in from its huge cash pile.

There is a limit, and it may already have been reached. The Associated Press reported that buybacks had probably stopped recently, as the Class A shares surged past $878,000, which would put the price above the level at which the programme is willing to buy. The Class B shares, which closed Friday at $570.89, are the same economics in a smaller denomination, and they touched a record close of $579.09 on Wednesday before easing. A buyback programme that stops when the price rises is not a flaw in the programme; it is the programme working as designed, buying only when the shares are judged cheap and standing aside when they are not. The $9.6 billion was spent while the price was lower. The question for the fourth quarter is whether the price stays high enough to keep the programme paused, or whether the market gives it another opening.

The buyback is also the second $12 billion-scale capital return announced this week. Airbnb authorised a new $12 billion buyback alongside its third-quarter beat, and the two announcements make the same point from opposite directions: companies with large cash piles and no dividend are returning cash through repurchases instead. For a halal investor, the distinction matters. A buyback returns cash without a dividend, which means there is no dividend to purify, but it does nothing to the business that generates the cash. Berkshire's buyback shrinks the share count. It does not shrink the insurance business, and it does not change the screen. That is the thread to hold through the rest of this article: the buyback is real, it is large, and it is irrelevant to the screening result.

Insurance dragged the quarter down

Operating earnings fell because insurance fell. Insurance underwriting profit dropped 43 percent to $1,352 million, and insurance investment income fell 14 percent to $2,734 million. The underwriting decline was driven by GEICO, where higher claims costs and increased advertising spending squeezed profits while peers were profitable. GEICO's profit had already declined in the previous quarter on the same pressures, so this is a second consecutive quarter of the same story, not a one-off. The rest of the conglomerate grew and offset part of the damage: BNSF, Berkshire Hathaway Energy and the manufacturing businesses all grew, which is why the total decline was 5.8 percent rather than something much worse.

Two acquisitions are now inside the numbers, and they show where the cash pile is going when it is not buying back stock. Homebuilder Taylor Morrison, bought on 24 July for about $6.8 billion in cash, produced roughly $1.1 billion of home sales by 30 September. OxyChem, the chemicals unit bought from Occidental Petroleum in January for about $9.4 billion, earned $71 million before tax in the quarter. Neither is large next to a $105.6 billion revenue quarter, but together they are the shape of Abel-era deployment: whole businesses bought for cash, added to the collection, and left to run. Berkshire was also a net buyer of stocks in the first nine months of the year, with purchases of $41.8 billion against sales of $30.6 billion, so the public portfolio grew as well as the private one.

The insurance float is the number that ties the quarter together. The float — premiums collected before claims are paid, held and invested in the meantime — stood at $178.5 billion at 30 September. The float is Berkshire's engine: it is the money that funds the stock portfolio, the acquisitions and, now, the buybacks. When underwriting is profitable, the float costs nothing; when underwriting profit falls 43 percent, the engine still runs, but it runs on thinner margins. The float is also the reason the insurance business cannot be separated from the rest of Berkshire in a screening sense. It is not a side business. It is the funding source for everything else the company does, and the premiums that build it are core operating revenue, not an incidental line.

The $377 billion cash pile, and what it earns

The cash pile grew to a record. The broader measure, which adds railroad and utility cash and unsettled Treasury bill purchases, reached $377.4 billion at the end of September, up from $365.5 billion at the end of June. The narrower measure, the cash, cash equivalents and Treasury bills held by the insurance and other businesses after netting out bill purchases that settled in October, was $352.3 billion, down 1.9 percent over the quarter. The two measures differ because of where the cash sits and when the bill purchases settle; the headline is the same either way, which is that Berkshire holds more cash than any other company on earth, and that the pile grew even after $9.6 billion of buybacks and $6.8 billion for Taylor Morrison in the same quarter.

That pile earns interest, and the interest is where the screen's ratio gates start to matter. Berkshire holds most of its cash in United States Treasury bills, and the yield on those bills is set by the Federal Reserve's rate decisions. Friday's jobs report, which showed 165,000 new jobs against about 65,000 expected, pushed the odds of a December rate hike to about 77 percent, and higher rates mean the pile earns more. Insurance investment income fell 14 percent in the quarter despite the size of the pile, which shows the yield is not the whole story — the mix of holdings and the timing of purchases matter too — but the direction of travel is clear enough: a larger pile at higher rates earns more interest income, and interest income is exactly what the screen's income gate measures.

There is an arithmetic point worth making, because it is easy to get wrong. On this site's October 2026 screen, cash and Treasury bills of $369.0 billion were 34.4 percent of a market capitalisation of about $1,074.2 billion, above the 30 percent ceiling. The market capitalisation has since risen to about $1.23 trillion, which would lower that ratio arithmetically if the cash figure were held fixed. But the screen is measured on filed figures at the refresh, not on a live market capitalisation, and the cash figure itself has now risen to $377.4 billion. The ratio will be recomputed when the screener page is refreshed on the new filing. The more important point is that the ratio is not the deciding gate for Berkshire, and it never has been. That is the next section.

The screen result: a FAIL at gate one

None of the quarter's numbers changes the screen. This site's screener page for Berkshire Hathaway, screened in October 2026 on the fiscal 2025 10-K, rates the company a FAIL, and the result turns on exactly one gate. Gate 1, business activity, fails: conventional insurance and reinsurance are a prohibited business activity, and they are a core part of Berkshire, not an incidental line. The financial ratios are shown on the screener page for transparency, but gate one decides, and the ratios do not change the result.

The ratios, for the record, are mixed. Gate 2, the financial-structure ratios, is a split decision. Interest-bearing debt of $129.08 billion is about 12.0 percent of market capitalisation, far below the roughly 33 percent ceiling, so the debt gate passes comfortably, and the reported disagreement between providers over whether that ceiling is 30 percent or about 33 percent does not matter here, because 12.0 percent is far below either. Cash and Treasury bills of $369.0 billion are about 34.4 percent of market capitalisation, above the 30 percent ceiling, so the cash gate fails. Gate 3, non-compliant income, is not applicable as a ratio: insurance premiums and investment income are core operating revenue, so there is no separate non-compliant income line to measure against total revenue. The full method is set out in the screening methodology.

The third-party coverage agrees with the fail, and it agrees for the same reason. Musaffa classifies Berkshire Hathaway as not halal as of November 2026, under its AAOIFI methodology. Zoya classifies the Class A shares as not Shariah-compliant as of 5 November 2026, based on the most recent financial reports. No ShariaPortfolio rating was found for Berkshire, reported as absent, not invented. Berkshire carries no BDS listing on the BDS movement's published boycott, divestment or pressure lists, checked October 2026, and the site's moral screen, which checks documented business ties to the Israeli and United States militaries and to weapons manufacturing, publishes no findings for Berkshire. The fail stands on the business-activity gate alone: insurance, and nothing else.

The timing is worth noting. The screener page said the next check was due after the third-quarter 2026 earnings, and those earnings are the release this article covers. The check is now due, and the refresh will be measured on the full 10-Q, not on the press-release summary that Berkshire itself says is not adequate for an informed judgment. Nothing in the release suggests the gate-one result will change at that refresh. The insurance business is still there, it is still core, and the premiums are still flowing. The refresh will update the ratios. It will not update the verdict.

Why gate one decides, and why the ratios don't save it

A gate-one fail is a different kind of fail from the ones this earnings season has produced, and the difference matters for how a halal investor should think about it. Most of the failing names in this season's coverage fail on a ratio. Airbnb fails at 5.76 percent on the income gate, 0.76 percentage points above the 5 percent ceiling, and the ratio is falling toward the line. Cloudflare fails at 6.05 percent and Palantir at 5.12 percent, both on the same gate. Those are arithmetic fails: a numerator that needs to shrink or a denominator that needs to grow, and a next filing that could flip them. Berkshire's fail is not arithmetic. It is structural. The business itself is the problem, and no quarterly print, however strong, changes a business.

The scale of the insurance business is what makes the gate-one fail unavoidable. A documented filing-based analysis of Berkshire's first-quarter 2026 10-Q put conventional insurance premiums of $22.005 billion plus interest, dividend and other investment income of $5.430 billion against revenue of $93.675 billion, a minimum of 29.29 percent of quarterly revenue from non-compliant sources, far above the 5 percent business-activity benchmark. That figure is a minimum, not an estimate: the filing does not separately isolate every interest-based lending, finance, leasing or portfolio-company revenue stream inside consolidated sales and service categories, so the true share is at least that large. A company whose documented minimum non-compliant revenue is nearly six times the benchmark is not a borderline case. It is a company whose core business is the prohibited activity.

That is also why the permissible businesses do not rescue it. Berkshire owns a railroad, energy utilities, manufacturers, retailers and service businesses that are, taken on their own, generally permissible lines. But the screen is applied to the company, not to its best division, and the insurance business is not a small division. It is the funding engine, the float is $178.5 billion, and the premiums are a large share of revenue. A conglomerate is screened as a whole, and a whole that contains a material prohibited business fails at gate one. The only change that would flip the result is a structural one: an exit from insurance, a spin-off of the insurance businesses, or a reorganisation that made insurance immaterial. Berkshire has given no indication of any of those, and the third quarter moved in the opposite direction, with two new acquisitions added to the collection and the insurance businesses still at the centre of it.

The buyback and the cash pile cannot fix a gate-one fail, because they change the capital structure, not the business mix. Buying back $9.6 billion of shares shrinks the share count and lifts per-share figures. It does not shrink the insurance premiums, and it does not change what the company does. Growing the cash pile to $377.4 billion adds Treasury bills to the balance sheet. It does not remove the underwriting business that generates the float. This is the sense in which Berkshire is the opposite of the near-ceiling names: for Airbnb, the question is whether the ratio crosses the line at the next filing; for Berkshire, the question is whether the company stops being an insurer, and the answer in this quarter's release is that it has not, and has not tried to.

How a halal investor should approach Berkshire

Berkshire is the hardest test of the screen-first habit, because it is the company most likely to make a halal investor want to skip the screen. It is the most famous investment vehicle in the world, run first by the most famous investor alive and now by his chosen successor, with a record of compounding that no other conglomerate matches, a cash pile larger than most countries' reserves, and a buyback programme that just spent a record $9.6 billion because it judged its own shares cheap. Every one of those facts is true, and none of them is a screen pass. The framework is the same one this site applies to every surge, and it is worth running in full precisely because the temptation to skip it is strongest here.

First, screen before you admire. Berkshire fails at gate one on conventional insurance and reinsurance. That fact does not change because the shares rose 13.6 percent this year, or because the buyback was the largest in the company's history, or because the cash pile is $377.4 billion. A halal investor who buys a failing name because it is well run has let quality do the screening, and quality is not the screen. Second, separate the business from the screen. Berkshire's operating businesses mostly grew in the quarter, revenue beat expectations, and the acquisitions are real businesses bought for cash. A company can be well run and still fail the screen, just as a company can pass the screen and be poorly run. The screen is not a quality rating. It is a compliance check, and the two judgments live on different axes.

Third, understand what the buyback does and does not do. A $9.6 billion repurchase returns cash to shareholders without a dividend, which means there is no dividend to purify — Berkshire pays no dividend, so the purification calculator has nothing to cleanse here — but the buyback does nothing to the interest income on the balance sheet or to the insurance premiums that decide the screen. Fourth, set the trigger correctly. For a ratio fail like Airbnb, the trigger is a filing: the fiscal 2026 10-K, due early in 2027. For a gate-one fail like Berkshire, the trigger is structural: an exit from insurance or a spin-off that made insurance immaterial. Quarterly earnings will not flip it, and watching the share price for a signal is watching the wrong number. Fifth, remember the currency. Berkshire is listed on the New York Stock Exchange in United States dollars, so a Canadian buyer pays the broker's conversion spread on the way in and on the way out, and the screen result is the same in either currency. Sixth, for readers who already hold Berkshire or a fund that holds it, the practical step is the same as for any failing name: check the holding against the screen, note the gate-one reason, and decide on the holding with the facts in front of you, not with the buyback headline. The zakat calculator can help with the zakat treatment of shares held, which is a separate question from whether the shares pass the screen, and the two should not be confused.

Finally, do not let the manager do the screening. The "Buffett halo" is a real temptation: the idea that a company run by Warren Buffett, and now by Greg Abel, must be a sound holding for a Muslim investor because the management is sound. Management quality is a reason to admire a company. It is not a reason to hold it. The screen asks what the company does, not who runs it, and what Berkshire does is sell conventional insurance at a scale no other company matches. Admire the record. Keep the screen.

What to watch next

The next document that matters is the full Form 10-Q for the third quarter, which Berkshire itself says is necessary for an informed judgment, and after it, the screener refresh that will recompute the ratios on the filed figures. The refresh will update the debt and cash ratios. It will not change the gate-one verdict, and readers should expect it to confirm the fail rather than lift it. The fourth-quarter results, due in February 2027, and the fiscal 2026 10-K after them, are the next full checkpoints, and the same logic applies: unless the business mix changes, the result will not.

Closer to the market, watch whether the buyback programme stays paused. The Associated Press reported that buybacks had probably stopped as the Class A shares surged past $878,000, so the fourth quarter will show whether the price stays high enough to keep the programme on hold, or whether a pullback gives it another opening. The December Federal Reserve meeting on 8 to 9 December matters for the cash pile, because a hike raises the yield on the Treasury bills that hold most of the $377.4 billion, and the October consumer price data, due Tuesday 10 November, is the next input to that decision. The Bank of Canada decides on 9 December, the same week.

The screener hub carries every result, and the market news hub will carry the December meetings and the fourth-quarter results as they land. For readers who hold any of the near-ceiling names, the practical next step is the same as it was after the jobs report: note the ratios as they stand, note that a single earnings beat changes none of them, and recheck them at the refresh. For readers who hold Berkshire itself, the next step is the screen-first habit applied to the holding, because the next record buyback will not be Berkshire's last, and the framework that worked this morning is the one that will work then. Run it through the screening methodology, check the companies on the screener hub, and build the rest of the decision from there. A buyback is a capital decision. The screen is the house. Read the buyback, and keep the house in order.

FAQ

What did Berkshire Hathaway report in the third quarter of 2026?

Berkshire reported operating earnings of 12.705 billion dollars, down 5.8 percent from 13.485 billion dollars a year earlier, or 8,907 dollars per Class A share against a FactSet consensus of about 8,821.84 dollars. Net earnings were 22.112 billion dollars, down 28 percent, as investment gains fell to 9.407 billion dollars from 17.3 billion dollars. Revenue was 105.6 billion dollars, up about 11 percent, against roughly 102 billion dollars expected. The company bought back 9.6 billion dollars of its own shares, the largest single quarter in its history, and its cash pile grew to a record 377.4 billion dollars.

Why did Berkshire buy back a record 9.6 billion dollars of its own stock?

Buybacks more than doubled from 4.5 billion dollars in the second quarter, after only 234 million dollars in the first quarter, bringing the nine-month total to about 14.4 billion dollars, with about 2 billion dollars more in the first four weeks of October. Reuters reported that the Greg Abel-led company found its own shares among the best assets to invest in from its huge cash pile, and the actual figure was six times the 1.6 billion dollars Visible Alpha had estimated. The programme bars buybacks that would cut cash and Treasury bills below 30 billion dollars, and the Associated Press reported buybacks had probably stopped recently as the Class A shares surged past 878,000 dollars.

Why did operating earnings fall if the operating businesses grew?

Insurance dragged the total down. Insurance underwriting profit fell 43 percent to 1.352 billion dollars, and insurance investment income fell 14 percent to 2.734 billion dollars, with GEICO hurt by higher claims costs and increased advertising spending. Growth at BNSF, Berkshire Hathaway Energy and the manufacturing businesses offset part of the decline, which is why the total fell 5.8 percent rather than much more. Net earnings fell further, by 28 percent, because investment gains on the stock portfolio nearly halved to 9.407 billion dollars from 17.3 billion dollars.

Does Berkshire Hathaway pass the Shariah screen?

No. This site's screener page, screened in October 2026 on the fiscal 2025 10-K, rates Berkshire a FAIL at gate one: conventional insurance and reinsurance are a prohibited business activity. The debt gate passes, with interest-bearing debt of 129.08 billion dollars at about 12.0 percent of market capitalisation, far below the roughly 33 percent ceiling. Cash and Treasury bills of 369.0 billion dollars were about 34.4 percent of market capitalisation, above the 30 percent ceiling, but gate one decides, so the ratios do not change the result. Musaffa classifies Berkshire as not halal as of November 2026, and Zoya classifies the Class A shares as not Shariah-compliant as of 5 November 2026. Berkshire carries no BDS listing, and the site's moral screen publishes no findings for it.

Could Berkshire ever pass the screen?

Only a structural change to the business mix would do it. Insurance is a core business: a documented filing-based analysis of the first-quarter 2026 10-Q put conventional insurance premiums of 22.005 billion dollars plus interest, dividend and other investment income of 5.430 billion dollars against revenue of 93.675 billion dollars, a minimum of 29.29 percent of quarterly revenue from non-compliant sources, far above the 5 percent business-activity benchmark. Quarterly earnings, buybacks and the cash pile change the capital structure, not the business. The next check is the full 10-Q and then the fourth-quarter results and fiscal 2026 10-K, but no earnings print alone flips a gate-one fail.

Is anything in this article a fatwa or a buy or sell call?

No. Everything here is facts and screening methodology only, with no fatwas and no personalised buy or sell calls. Rulings on your own situation belong with a qualified scholar, and investment decisions belong with advice suited to your circumstances. Not financial advice. Facts and screening methodology only, no fatwas.

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