Are Restaurant Stocks Halal? Screening Starbucks, McDonald's, Tim Hortons, and the Restaurant Names (2026)
Three of the thirteen restaurant companies this site has screened pass the Shariah screen — and the ten that fail do so in three distinct ways. Starbucks passes, with debt of 14.78% of its market capitalisation and interest income of at most 0.30% of revenue. McDonald's fails at the first gate, the business itself, because pork and beer sit on its menus in many markets — even though its ratios pass comfortably. Restaurant Brands, the company behind Tim Hortons, fails on debt at 53.2%. And all six Canadian restaurant names fail: not one passes. This guide works through the business gate and the menu question, every restaurant screener result on the site, the McDonald's fail, the alcohol fails, the debt fails, the Canadian sweep, the three passes, the BDS layer, and the checklist a Canadian investor should run before buying.
Updated November 2026 · 21-minute read · Reviewed by the Canadian Halal Investor team
Why restaurants raise a Shariah question at all
A restaurant feels like the most obviously halal sector in the market. It sells food. People eat there every day, including the Canadian Muslim investor reading this guide — at Tim Hortons on the way to work, at A&W on a road trip, at a Boston Pizza with the family. None of those is a prohibited business in the abstract, and an investor could be forgiven for assuming the companies behind the restaurants are just as straightforward. The screen says otherwise: of the thirteen restaurant names this site has screened, ten fail — and the failures are not a rounding error. They are the pattern this guide is about.
The question has two parts, and they arrive in order. First, what is actually on the menu: a restaurant is a bundle of food and drink, and the bundle can include pork or alcohol as a core item rather than a garnish. Second, how the company is financed: restaurant groups grow by acquisition and by franchising, and the debt that funds the growth can push the ratio past the ceiling even when the menu is perfectly ordinary. The two parts fail different companies for different reasons, and that is what makes the sector a good screen: five of the ten fails are business-gate fails, and five are ratio fails, and the two groups barely overlap.
The site's own traffic says the question is live. Over the last fourteen days, the most-visited screener pages are the technology and semiconductor names — Broadcom, Micron, TSMC, Intel — and the AI and semiconductor guide, the software guide and the retail guide sit in that cluster. This guide is the restaurant companion to that series: the same two gates, applied to the companies that feed Canadians. The rest of it takes the names in turn: the business gate, every screener result, the McDonald's fail, the alcohol fails, the debt fails, the Canadian names, the three passes, the BDS layer, and the checklist before buying.
Gate one: the menu is the screen
Gate one asks a single question: does the company earn its money from a prohibited activity? The screen's list of prohibited businesses is short and familiar — alcohol, pork, gambling, tobacco, conventional banking and insurance, adult entertainment, weapons — and selling food appears nowhere on it. That is why the gate-one discussion for restaurants is almost entirely about the exceptions, and the exceptions are instructive, because a restaurant is a bundle: the question is never whether the main product is permissible, but whether something else in the bundle changes the answer.
The pork exception is the most common. McDonald's menus in many markets include sausage, bacon and the McRib, a pork patty. A&W Canada's core breakfast items are the Bacon & Egger (naturally smoked bacon from pork) and the Sausage & Egger (sausage patty from pork), per A&W's own menu descriptions, plus bacon breakfast wraps. Boston Pizza Royalties is the subtler form of the same fail: the fund itself sells nothing, but its royalty is charged on the gross sales of Boston Pizza restaurants, and pork-derived products are included in that gross royalty base — so the investor's income is tied to pork sales even though the fund never touches a kitchen. In all three cases the business gate fails, and the ratios never get to rescue the result.
The alcohol exception takes three forms. The first is the bar-driven restaurant: Darden discloses alcohol at 10.0% of its FY2026 sales, and Texas Roadhouse at 9.6% of its 2024 restaurant sales — in both cases a disclosed, material share of the business, not a rounding error. The second is the sports bar: Aegis Brands owns the St. Louis Bar & Grill chain, about 81 locations across Canada, and the company's own franchise marketing cites "consistently high beer revenue" as proven demand — alcohol is a material disclosed business line, and the gate fails. The third is the royalty base again: SIR Royalty Income Fund charges its 6% royalty on the food-and-beverage revenue of bar-and-grill restaurants, and alcohol sales sit inside that royalty base. Three forms, one rule: when alcohol is a material line of the business, or of the revenue the investor is paid on, gate one fails.
The Starbucks exception is the one that proves the rule, and it is worth stating precisely, because it is where the screen's judgement lives. Starbucks ended its "Evenings" wine-and-beer program in January 2017, and alcohol is now served only at the handful of flagship Reserve Roastery locations — the Chicago Roastery's Arriviamo Bar, where official Starbucks menus list cocktails, wine and beer. Against more than 40,000 stores worldwide, that is de minimis and immaterial: no alcohol, wine or beer is mentioned anywhere in the FY2025 10-K, and the exposure sits well under the 5% tolerance for prohibited segments. This is not a categorical business-gate failure — contrast the retail guide, where alcohol was a material grocery category at Walmart. The screen does not ask whether a prohibited product exists anywhere in the company. It asks whether it is a material business line, and at Starbucks it is not.
What the screeners actually say: every restaurant name on this site
Thirteen restaurant companies have been screened on this site, between September 1 and October 2, 2026, and the table below lists every one of them with the two ratios that decide the financial gates. Three pass. Ten fail. The debt column is interest-bearing debt as a share of market capitalisation, against a roughly 33% ceiling. The income column is non-compliant income — overwhelmingly interest income — as a share of revenue, against a roughly 5% ceiling. "Not disclosed" means the screener page found no separately disclosed interest-income figure to test; it is a statement about the filing, not a pass. The cash gate, cash plus interest-bearing securities against a roughly 33% ceiling, is applied on each screener page and is not shown here; the fails in this guide fail on the gates their pages state, not on cash.
| Company | Ticker | Result | Debt (% of market cap) | Non-compliant income (% of revenue) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Starbucks | SBUX | PASS | 14.78% | 0.3% |
| Yum! Brands | YUM | PASS* | 32.05% | 0.14% |
| Shake Shack | SHAK | PASS | 10.09% | 0.01% |
| McDonald's | MCD | FAIL | 24.09% | 0.32% |
| Restaurant Brands | QSR | FAIL | 53.2% | Not disclosed |
| Domino's Pizza | DPZ | FAIL | 49.3% | 0.18% |
| Darden Restaurants | DRI | FAIL | 10.37% | 0.02% |
| Texas Roadhouse | TXRH | FAIL | 0.48% | 0.06% |
| A&W Food Services | AW | FAIL | 26.3% | 9.0% |
| MTY Food Group | MTY | FAIL | 81.9% | 0.02% |
| Boston Pizza Royalties | BPF.UN | FAIL | 19.9% | 0.19% |
| Aegis Brands | AEG | FAIL | 150.4% | Not disclosed |
| SIR Royalty Income Fund | SRV.UN | FAIL | 0.0% | 23.8% |
Three things stand out in the table before any single company is discussed. First, the fails split almost evenly between the two gates: five fail at the business gate (McDonald's, A&W, Boston Pizza Royalties, Aegis, SIR Royalty) and five fail on the ratios (Restaurant Brands, Domino's, MTY on debt; A&W and SIR Royalty again on income). A&W and SIR Royalty fail twice over — the business and the income gate — which is why they sit in both groups. Second, the debt fails are not close: MTY at 81.9%, Restaurant Brands at 53.2%, Domino's at 49.3%, Aegis at 150.4%. These are balance sheets carrying half their market value in debt or more, not borderline calls. Third, the income column is decisive in a way it is not in the retail guide: A&W at 9.0% and SIR Royalty at 23.8% both fail the roughly 5% ceiling outright, while every other name in the table passes it. The two income fails are also the two royalty-and-franchise structures where the income is interest on a loan to the operating company — a pattern worth watching wherever a fund lends to its own restaurants.
A note on what the table does not contain: the unscreened names. Wendy's, Chipotle, Brinker (Chili's), Cheesecake Factory, Bloomin' Brands, Jack in the Box and Papa John's have no screener page on this site yet, and no result is claimed for them here — an unscreened name is not a passing name, and the watch section below lists them as the next names to check. One ticker trap to avoid: the CMG entry in this site's registry is Computer Modelling Group, a TSX software company — not Chipotle, which trades as CMG on the NYSE and has no screener page here. The same-ticker, different-company trap has bitten this site before, and the queue now records it so the two are never confused again.
McDonald's: the menu fail
McDonald's is the one name in this guide where the ratios and the result disagree, and the disagreement is the point. Per its October 2026 screener, McDonald's debt of 24.09% of market capitalisation and non-compliant income of 0.32% of revenue both pass the financial gates by a wide margin. On the numbers alone it would pass. It fails at gate one, business activity, and it fails there because of what is on the menu.
The menus in many markets include pork products — sausage, bacon (the Grand Bacon TS, Big Tasty Bacon, the Bacon McDouble, sausage breakfast items) and the McRib, a pork patty — and its locations in more than a dozen countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and others) serve beer with meals. Pork and alcohol are on this screener's prohibited list, so the business gate fails and the ratios never get to rescue the result. That is the whole of the failure, and it is worth stating precisely, because it is a different kind of fail from the debt fails in this guide. McDonald's is not too indebted, and it does not earn too much interest. It sells prohibited products, in its core business, across many markets — and a screen that cannot verify the business cannot pass it.
The contrast with Starbucks is the cleanest demonstration of the gate in this guide. Starbucks is the same kind of company — a global quick-service restaurant chain, selling food and drink in thousands of locations — and it passes every gate: its business raises no gate-one question beyond the de minimis Roastery alcohol, its debt is 14.78% of market capitalisation, and its interest income is at most 0.30% of revenue. The difference is not the format, the size, or the margins. It is the contents of the menu. An investor who wants restaurant exposure and buys McDonald's instead of Starbucks is buying the same theme through a company that fails the first gate, and the screen does not let the investor choose which half of the menu counts. The remedy is the same as for any fail: the guide on what to do when a holding fails the screen walks through the options, and the passing names in the table above are the starting point for a replacement.
The alcohol fails: Darden, Texas Roadhouse, Aegis, SIR Royalty
Four names in this guide fail because alcohol is a material part of the business, and the four show the four shapes the fail takes. Darden Restaurants — Olive Garden, LongHorn Steakhouse, and the other full-service brands — discloses alcoholic beverages at 10.0% of its FY2026 sales, as stated in its FY2026 10-K. Its debt of 10.37% of market capitalisation and its non-compliant income of 0.02% of revenue both pass the financial gates by a wide margin, so the fail is entirely the business: a full-service restaurant operator whose bar is a tenth of the business. Texas Roadhouse is the same shape at a similar scale: alcohol is core to its bar-driven restaurant model, at 9.6% of its 2024 restaurant sales, while its debt of 0.48% of market capitalisation is the lowest in this guide — a company that is almost debt-free and still fails, because the screen tests the business first.
Aegis Brands is the sports-bar form of the fail, and it fails twice. The company owns the St. Louis Bar & Grill brand — a sports-bar chain with about 81 locations across Canada, per its Annual Information Form — and holds the master franchise for the Sweet Jesus ice cream brand in Canada. Alcohol is a material disclosed business line: the company's official franchise marketing lists "consistently high beer revenue" as a proven-demand selling point, and St. Louis locations are categorised as Sports Bar / Bar / Pub, with beer service documented. Gate one fails. Separately, total liabilities of C$32.460M at March 29, 2026 are about 150% of its roughly C$21.58M market capitalisation, far above the roughly 33% debt ceiling — interest-bearing debt alone (C$23.087M) is about 107% of market cap. Interest income is not separately disclosed in the interim filings, so the income ratio is unverifiable and reported as such, not guessed. The FAIL is already decided by gates one and two; the missing income figure changes nothing.
SIR Royalty Income Fund is the royalty form of the fail, and it also fails twice. The fund is a limited-purpose trust that earns royalty income of 6% on the food-and-beverage revenue of SIR Corp's bar-and-grill restaurants — and alcohol sales sit inside the royalty base, so the business gate fails: the investor is paid a share of alcohol sales. Separately, its 7.5% SIR Loan interest income is about 24% of total income, roughly five times the roughly 5% ceiling, so the income gate fails too — the highest non-compliant income ratio in this guide, and one of the highest on the whole site. Its debt ratio is 0.0%, which is the table's reminder that a clean balance sheet does not rescue a failed business or a failed income gate. Boston Pizza Royalties is the same royalty shape in pork form: the fund's royalty is charged on gross sales that include pork-derived products, so the business gate fails there too, on a debt ratio of 19.9% and income of 0.19% that would otherwise pass. The royalty funds are the guide's warning about structure: what matters is not what the fund sells — it sells nothing — but what its income is a share of.
The debt fails: Restaurant Brands, Domino's, MTY
Three names in this guide fail the same way — on debt — and the pattern is worth understanding, because it is the pattern most likely to catch the next restaurant name too. Restaurant groups grow by acquisition, and acquisitions are bought with borrowed money: the debt gate divides total debt by market capitalisation, so the ratio is a statement about the balance sheet relative to what the market thinks the company is worth — and in restaurants, the balance sheet is heavy and the market value is modest. That combination is what the table shows.
Restaurant Brands International is the Canadian name in the group, and the most instructive. It owns Tim Hortons, Burger King and Popeyes — about 33,000 quick-service restaurants worldwide, operating overwhelmingly on a franchised model — and the restaurant business passes gate one without difficulty: quick-service restaurants are not a prohibited industry under any major methodology. The balance sheet is the problem, and it is a legacy problem: gross interest-bearing debt of about US$13.29B against a market capitalisation of about US$24.98B, for a debt-to-market-cap ratio of about 53.2% — far above the roughly 33% ceiling. The debt is the residue of the debt-funded Burger King merger, and net leverage did improve to 4.1x in Q2 2026, but it is not close to screen-compliant. Because the debt screen fails so decisively, the remaining ratio screens are not applied — the result cannot be rescued by the cash or income gates. The company trades on both the TSX and the NYSE, so a Canadian investor can buy it in Canadian dollars and still fail the screen: the listing does not change the leverage.
Domino's Pizza is the same pattern at a smaller scale: debt of about 49.3% of market capitalisation against the roughly 33% ceiling, with non-compliant income of 0.18% of revenue passing comfortably. The pizza business raises no gate-one question; the balance sheet does. MTY Food Group is the extreme case: the company franchises and operates more than 7,000 restaurants across 80-plus banners in Canada and internationally, and its C$594 million of long-term debt is about 82% of market capitalisation — a decisive FAIL on the debt gate, on a business that passes gate one and an income ratio of 0.02% that passes by a wide margin. MTY is the guide's purest debt fail: nothing wrong with the restaurants, everything wrong with the leverage. All three names show the same discipline point — the debt gate divides by market capitalisation, so a falling share price pushes the ratio up without the company borrowing a dollar more, and a PASS is a snapshot dated to the screening, not a permanent property of the company.
The Canadian names: all six fail
Six of the thirteen names in this guide are Canadian, and none of them passes. That sweep is the most useful fact in the guide for a Canadian investor, because these are the companies behind the restaurants the investor actually eats at, and the results do not follow the diner's intuition. The biggest Canadian restaurant company fails on debt. The biggest Canadian franchisor fails on debt. The breakfast chain fails on pork. The two royalty funds fail on what their royalties are charged on. The sports-bar owner fails on beer and on leverage. The table is not a ranking of the restaurants; it is a ranking of menus and balance sheets.
Restaurant Brands is the flagship fail, and the flagship debt story: Tim Hortons, Burger King and Popeyes pass gate one, and the 53.2% debt ratio fails gate two — the legacy of the debt-funded Burger King merger, on a balance sheet of about US$13.29B of debt against about US$24.98B of market value. MTY is the same story at the franchisor level: more than 7,000 restaurants and 80-plus banners, C$594 million of long-term debt, about 82% of market capitalisation. A&W is the menu fail: 1,105 restaurants at June 14, 2026 (1,095 franchised, 10 corporate in Ottawa), the Bacon & Egger and Sausage & Egger as core breakfast items per A&W's own menu descriptions, a business gate that fails — and a non-compliant income ratio of 9.0% that fails the roughly 5% ceiling as well. A&W also holds the Canadian master-franchise rights for Pret A Manger (three shops in Toronto) and owns 60% of A&W Root Beer Beverages of Canada Inc. — neither of which changes the result.
The two royalty funds are the structural fails. Boston Pizza Royalties Income Fund charges its royalty on the gross sales of Boston Pizza restaurants, and pork-derived products are included in that gross royalty base — so the business gate fails on a debt ratio of 19.9% and income of 0.19% that would otherwise pass. SIR Royalty Income Fund charges 6% on the food-and-beverage revenue of bar-and-grill restaurants, with alcohol inside the base, and earns 7.5% interest income on its SIR Loan worth about 24% of total income — both gates fail. Aegis Brands is the double fail: the St. Louis Bar & Grill sports-bar business, where the company's own franchise marketing cites "consistently high beer revenue", and total liabilities of about 150% of market capitalisation. Six names, three failure modes — menu, royalty base, leverage — and not one Canadian restaurant name passes. A Canadian investor who wants restaurant exposure through a domestic name has, on this site's screen, no option at all: the passing names are all American.
The three passes: Starbucks, Yum! Brands, Shake Shack
Starbucks is the cleanest pass in the guide, and the largest. Per its FY2025 10-K (fiscal year ended September 28, 2025), the company is a roaster, marketer and retailer of specialty coffee, operating company-operated and licensed stores globally, with FY2025 net revenues of $37,184.4M. Current portion of long-term debt was $1,498.9M and long-term debt was $14,575.9M, for total debt of $16,074.8M — against a market capitalisation of about $108.76B, a debt-to-market-cap ratio of about 14.78%, below the roughly 33% ceiling. Its FY2025 "Interest income and other, net" line was $113.3M — the 10-K bundles "other" into the line, so $113.3M is a conservative upper bound on interest income, about 0.30% of revenue, below the roughly 5% ceiling. The business gate passes too, for the reasons in the gate-one section: the "Evenings" program ended in January 2017, the only alcohol is at a handful of Reserve Roastery locations, and no alcohol is mentioned in the FY2025 10-K. Coffee is not a prohibited business, and the ratios pass with room to spare.
Yum! Brands is the pass with an asterisk, and the asterisk is the whole story. The company is a global quick-service restaurant franchisor headquartered in Louisville, Kentucky: about 64,000 restaurants in more than 150 countries and territories at June 30, 2026 (KFC 34,747; Pizza Hut 19,985; Taco Bell 9,046; Habit Burger Grill 388), roughly 97% franchised, with revenue from company restaurant sales, franchise royalties and fees, and advertising contributions. On June 16, 2026 Yum! entered definitive agreements to sell the Pizza Hut business — LongRange Capital acquiring Pizza Hut excluding Mainland China, Yum China acquiring Pizza Hut in Mainland China — and the sale closed around September 1, 2026, leaving KFC, Taco Bell and Habit Burger Grill. This site's screen gives Yum! a PASS: the business is clean, with no alcohol, tobacco, gambling, weapons or conventional-finance line disclosed in the filings; total interest-bearing debt of $12,275M is about 32.05% of its roughly $38.3B market capitalisation — below the roughly 33% ceiling, though the margin is tight; and non-compliant income of about 0.14% of revenue passes comfortably. But Zoya and Musaffa independently rate Yum! not Shariah-compliant / not halal as of October 2026, which differs from this screen's computed result. The screener page reports that disagreement in full, and this guide does the same: an investor who follows this site's screen would hold Yum!; an investor who follows Zoya or Musaffa would not. And the tight debt margin matters on its own: at 32.05% against a 33% ceiling, a single quarter's move in the share price or the debt could change the answer, so Yum! is the passing name most in need of re-checking.
Shake Shack is the simplest pass in the guide. The New York-based burger chain passes on debt of 10.09% of market capitalisation and non-compliant income of 0.01% of revenue — both ratios far under their ceilings, on a business (burgers, shakes, fries) that raises no gate-one question. There is no asterisk, no dissenting screener noted on its page, and no material alcohol or pork line to argue about: the menu is the business, the business is permissible, and the balance sheet is light. Shake Shack is the smallest of the three passes by market value, and the least complicated — which is itself a useful fact. In a sector where ten of thirteen names fail, the cleanest result belongs to the simplest company.
The BDS layer: four names carry a listing, none of them changes a result
Four restaurant names in this guide appear on the BDS movement's published boycott guide, and the four show why the BDS screen is a separate layer from the Shariah screen. McDonald's carries a BDS-supported boycott listing: the BDS movement supports the grassroots boycott campaign, citing the Israeli franchisee's donations to the Israeli military. Restaurant Brands carries one too, through Burger King, a Restaurant Brands chain. Yum! Brands carries one, through Pizza Hut and KFC, Yum! chains. Domino's carries one, as a named target of the grassroots campaign. The other nine names — Starbucks, Shake Shack, Darden, Texas Roadhouse, A&W, MTY, Boston Pizza Royalties, Aegis and SIR Royalty — carry no BDS listing. No restaurant name in this guide carries a published moral-screen finding: the moral screen publishes only with a named public source, and the default where there is none is "No findings published."
The independence of the layers is the point, and the restaurant guide shows it from both directions. McDonald's fails the Shariah screen and carries a BDS listing — the two agree in direction, but for different reasons, and the listing does not cause the fail: the fail is the pork and the beer on the menu. Yum! Brands passes the Shariah screen and carries a BDS listing — the two disagree in direction, and the listing does not cause a fail either: the pass is the clean business and the passing ratios. An investor who treats the BDS listing as decisive and an investor who ignores it will build different portfolios from the same PASS list, and that is a choice the site leaves to the investor, with the sources named so the choice can be made on evidence rather than on rumour. What the listing does not do is change the screen: the BDS screen is informational, it records whether a company appears on the BDS movement's published lists, it is attributed to the BDS movement as the source, and it never changes a PASS or a FAIL. The same structure applies to every name in this guide — the screen decides PASS or FAIL, and the informational layer adds context the investor may or may not act on.
Restaurant ETFs: screen the holdings, not the label
Most Canadian investors will not buy thirteen individual restaurant stocks. They will buy a fund, and the fund question is different from the stock question: a fund that calls itself a consumer fund, or even a restaurant fund, holds whatever its index holds, and the index does not apply a Shariah screen. The halal ETF comparison on this site covers the screened funds — SPUS, HLAL and WSHR — and the method for checking any other fund is the guide to screening a fund's holdings yourself: take the fund's holdings list, run each holding through the two gates, and weight the result. A fund that holds Starbucks, McDonald's and Restaurant Brands alongside Darden and Domino's is not a halal fund because most of its holdings pass; it is a fund with a known impure share, and the investor's job is to measure that share and decide what to do with it.
Restaurants make this exercise unusually tractable, because the holdings are concentrated and familiar. A broad consumer-discretionary fund's top holdings will usually include McDonald's and Starbucks — the guide's biggest gate-one fail and its cleanest pass, sitting side by side in the same fund. The fails hide in plain sight: a fund that holds McDonald's at a 5% or 10% weight is carrying a gate-one fail at a weight the investor can see, and the question is whether the investor purifies, avoids, or accepts it — a question the purification guide answers for dividends and the fund-holdings guide answers for the holdings themselves. The worst outcome is not holding a failing name at a small weight; it is holding it without knowing it is there. The table in this guide is the checklist: any fund whose holdings list contains a name marked FAIL above is carrying that fail, whatever the fund's marketing says.
One more fund-level caution, specific to restaurants: the sector's weight in broad-market funds is small enough that a "diversified" index fund's restaurant slice looks negligible — and that is exactly why it gets ignored. But the slice is split between passes and fails in roughly the proportions of the table above, and the fails are gate-one fails, not ratio fails: a fund that holds McDonald's is not holding a company that is slightly over a debt ceiling, it is holding a company whose menus include pork and beer. That is a portfolio-construction observation, not a screening result, and it is covered in the rebalancing guide. But it means the screen results in this guide do more work than they appear to: the same three passing names recur in almost every fund a Canadian investor is likely to own, and knowing that Starbucks passes and McDonald's fails is knowing something about the fund, not just about the stock.
The Canadian investor's checklist
Before buying any restaurant stock, run these five checks in order. First, the screen result on this site — or run the two gates yourself, using the methodology page, if the name has not been screened. The thirteen names above are the screened set; Wendy's, Chipotle, Brinker, Cheesecake Factory, Bloomin' Brands, Jack in the Box and Papa John's have no result yet, and an unscreened name is not a passing name. Second, the listing and the account: the Canadian names in this guide trade in Toronto in Canadian dollars, while the US names trade in New York or on Nasdaq and carry 15% withholding tax on dividends inside a TFSA, treaty-exempt inside an RRSP — the asset-location guide works through the account choice.
Third, purification. Starbucks and Yum! Brands pay dividends, so a small impure share of each dividend needs purifying every year, using the purification guide and the purification calculator. Shake Shack pays none, so it carries no dividend purification at all, which is a genuine simplification, though it is not a reason to prefer it: a dividend is not a defect, and a non-payer is not automatically a better holding. Fourth, zakat: shares are zakatable wealth, and the zakat-on-stocks guide and the zakat calculator cover the calculation, which is separate from purification and must not be confused with it.
Fifth, and most important in this sector, re-screen before adding to a position. A PASS is dated to its screening — September and October 2026 for every name in this guide — and the two ratios that decide it move with the share price, the revenue, and the cash balance. Yum! Brands, at 32.05% debt against a 33% ceiling, is the passing name where a single quarter could change the answer, and the site's own screeners are the place to check: each screener page carries its screening date and its figures, and a result that has changed will say so. The discipline is cheap and the surprise is expensive. Buy the screen result as it stands today, not as it stood when this guide was written.
What to watch next
Three things will move the restaurant screen over the next year, and all three are worth watching rather than predicting. The first is the unscreened names: Wendy's, Chipotle, Brinker, Cheesecake Factory, Bloomin' Brands, Jack in the Box and Papa John's are all names a Canadian investor is likely to ask about, and none of them has a result yet. Chipotle is the most interesting of the seven, because it is the closest US analogue to the quick-service names in this guide — and because its ticker, CMG, already belongs to a different company in this site's registry (Computer Modelling Group, a TSX software company), so the screen will need to be built from scratch rather than looked up. The second is the debt drift: the three debt fails in this guide are all companies whose ratios could move with deleveraging, and Restaurant Brands at 53.2% and MTY at 81.9% are the names where a sustained paydown would matter most — while on the other side, a single debt-funded acquisition by a passing name, the pattern that failed Pfizer in the pharma guide and Lowe's in the retail guide, would test the same gate from the other direction.
The third is the business gate, which is where McDonald's failed and where the next surprise is most likely to come from. Restaurant groups keep adding delivery, alcohol and franchised formats, because the margins are attractive and the distribution is already built. Aegis is the domestic example of a format that is a bar first and a restaurant second, and each new format is a gate-one question, decided company by company. An investor who watches only the ratios will miss it; the menu has to be watched too. The site's screeners are re-run as filings arrive, and the screener hub is where a changed result appears first. Restaurant stocks, screened properly, are a narrow opportunity: three passing names, ten failing ones whose failures are narrow or structural, and a field of unscreened names still to be checked. That narrowness is itself the finding. A halal investor who wants restaurant exposure can get it — through Starbucks, with the Roastery alcohol noted and purification planned on the dividend, or through Yum! with the Zoya and Musaffa dissent in view, or through Shake Shack — but the sector rewards the screen: the same theme, bought through McDonald's instead of Starbucks, is a different investment entirely. Buy the screen result, not the theme.
FAQ
Are restaurant stocks halal?
It depends on the company, and the menu decides more often than the balance sheet. Of the thirteen restaurant companies this site has screened, three pass — Starbucks, Yum! Brands (with a dissenting-screener asterisk) and Shake Shack — and ten fail. Five of the ten fail at the first gate, the business itself: McDonald's, A&W, Boston Pizza Royalties, Aegis Brands and SIR Royalty fail because pork or alcohol sits in the menu or in the royalty base. The other five fail on the financial gates: Restaurant Brands, Domino's and MTY Food Group on debt, and SIR Royalty also on interest income. A restaurant is not automatically halal because it sells food — the screen tests what is on the menu first and the ratios second. This is a screening result, not a fatwa.
Why does McDonald's fail when its debt and income ratios pass?
Because the screen tests the business before the ratios, and McDonald's fails the business test. Its financial ratios pass comfortably: debt of 24.09% of market capitalisation against a roughly 33% ceiling, and non-compliant income of 0.32% of revenue against a roughly 5% ceiling. But its menus in many markets include pork products — sausage, bacon (the Grand Bacon TS, Big Tasty Bacon, the Bacon McDouble, sausage breakfast items) and the McRib, a pork patty — and its locations in more than a dozen countries (France, Germany, Belgium, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Austria and others) serve beer with meals. Pork and alcohol are on this screener's prohibited list, so the business gate fails and the ratios never get to rescue the result. The BDS layer is separate: the BDS movement supports a grassroots boycott campaign against McDonald's, citing the Israeli franchisee's donations to the Israeli military — an informational listing that never changes a PASS or a FAIL.
Why does Starbucks pass if some of its locations serve alcohol?
Because the alcohol is de minimis, not material. Starbucks ended its 'Evenings' wine-and-beer program in January 2017, and alcohol is now served only at the handful of flagship Reserve Roastery locations — for example the Chicago Roastery's Arriviamo Bar, where official Starbucks menus list cocktails, wine and beer. Against more than 40,000 stores worldwide, that is immaterial: no alcohol, wine or beer is mentioned anywhere in the FY2025 10-K, and the exposure sits well under the 5% tolerance for prohibited segments. Contrast McDonald's, where pork and beer are core menu items across many markets, or Darden, where alcohol is 10.0% of sales. The screen does not ask whether a prohibited product exists anywhere in the company; it asks whether it is a material business line. At Starbucks it is not, so the business gate passes — and the ratios pass too, with debt of 14.78% of market capitalisation and non-compliant income of at most 0.30% of revenue.
Why does Yum! Brands pass here when Zoya and Musaffa say it is not halal?
This is a genuine disagreement between screeners, and this page reports it rather than settling it. This site's screen gives Yum! Brands a PASS: the business — quick-service restaurant franchising through KFC, Taco Bell and Habit Burger Grill — is clean, with no alcohol, tobacco, gambling, weapons or conventional-finance line disclosed in the filings; debt of about 32.05% of market capitalisation passes the roughly 33% ceiling, though the margin is tight; and non-compliant income of about 0.14% of revenue passes the roughly 5% ceiling. Zoya and Musaffa independently rate Yum! not Shariah-compliant / not halal as of October 2026, which differs from this screen's computed result. The two sides are applying different conventions — the threshold and business-activity treatments are where screeners diverge, and the 5% rule guide on this site explains why the tolerance exists at all. An investor who follows this site's screen would hold Yum!; an investor who follows Zoya or Musaffa would not — and both positions are visible on the same screener page. This is a screening result, not a fatwa.
Why do all six Canadian restaurant names fail?
For three different reasons, which is what makes the sweep instructive. Restaurant Brands (Tim Hortons, Burger King, Popeyes) fails on debt: about 53.2% of market capitalisation, a legacy of the debt-funded Burger King merger. MTY Food Group fails on debt too, at about 81.9% — C$594 million of long-term debt against a much smaller market value, across more than 7,000 restaurants and 80-plus banners. A&W fails at the business gate: pork products are core menu items (the Bacon & Egger and Sausage & Egger), and its non-compliant income of 9.0% of revenue also fails the roughly 5% ceiling. Boston Pizza Royalties fails at the business gate: pork-derived products are included in the gross sales on which its royalty is charged. Aegis Brands fails twice: its St. Louis Bar & Grill chain is a sports-bar business where the company's own franchise marketing cites 'consistently high beer revenue', and its total liabilities are about 150% of market capitalisation. SIR Royalty fails twice as well: its 6% royalty is charged on bar-and-grill food-and-beverage revenue that includes alcohol, and its 7.5% SIR Loan interest income is about 24% of total income, roughly five times the ceiling. Six names, three failure modes — and not one Canadian restaurant name passes.
What should a Canadian investor check before buying a restaurant stock?
Four things. First, the screen result on this site — or run the two gates yourself if the name has not been screened. Seven restaurant names have no result yet: Wendy's, Chipotle, Brinker (Chili's), Cheesecake Factory, Bloomin' Brands, Jack in the Box and Papa John's are all unscreened, and an unscreened name is not a passing name. Note the ticker trap: the CMG entry in this site's registry is Computer Modelling Group, a TSX software company — not Chipotle, which trades as CMG on the NYSE and has no screener page here. Second, the listing: the Canadian names — Restaurant Brands, A&W, MTY, Boston Pizza Royalties, Aegis and SIR Royalty — trade in Toronto in Canadian dollars, while the US names trade in New York or on Nasdaq and carry 15% withholding tax on dividends inside a TFSA, treaty-exempt inside an RRSP. Third, purification: Starbucks and Yum! Brands pay dividends, so a small impure share of each dividend needs purifying every year, while Shake Shack pays none and carries no dividend purification. Fourth, re-screening: a PASS can turn FAIL when financials change, and Yum! Brands — at 32.05% debt against a 33% ceiling — is the passing name where a single quarter could change the answer.