Are Software Stocks Halal? Screening Microsoft, Salesforce, Adobe, Shopify, and the SaaS Names (2026)
Fourteen of the eighteen software and platform companies this site has screened pass the Shariah screen — and the four that fail do so in two distinct ways. Microsoft passes with debt of 1.06% of its market capitalisation and interest income of 0.99% of revenue. Salesforce passes at 20.17% debt. Shopify, the Canadian name, passes with effectively no debt. Palantir, Datadog and Airbnb fail the same gate — interest income above the roughly 5% ceiling — while Intuit fails at the first gate, the business itself, despite passing both financial ratios. This guide works through the business gate and the subscription question, every software screener result on the site, the interest-income pattern that fails three names, the borderline passes sitting closest to the ceilings, and the checklist a Canadian investor should run before buying.
Updated November 2026 · 19-minute read · Reviewed by the Canadian Halal Investor team
Why software raises a Shariah question at all
Software is the largest single theme in a halal investor's watchlist, and the hardest to think about clearly. It is the sector that powers the modern economy — the operating systems, the cloud platforms, the design tools, the customer databases — and it is also the sector where the halal question arrives in its most technical form. An investor asking "is Microsoft halal?" is usually asking three things at once: is selling software a permissible business, does the company's balance sheet clear the financial gates, and what about the subscription — is charging every month, forever, anything like charging interest? The screen answers them in order, and the answers are different for different companies. Microsoft and Palantir are both software companies, both sell subscriptions, and they land on opposite sides of the screen. The difference is not the software. It is the interest income.
The question has also become louder for a reason that has nothing to do with screening: software is where the money is. The site's own traffic says so — over the last fourteen days, the most-visited screener pages are the technology names, and the AI and semiconductor guide published three days ago sits in the same cluster. The software names are the other half of that story: the same investors screening Nvidia and Broadcom are screening the companies whose software runs on those chips. This guide is the companion piece — the same two gates, applied to the companies that sell the code rather than the silicon.
There is a Canadian edge, too, and it is sharper here than in most sectors. Canada has exactly one software company of global scale — Shopify — and it passes. Everything else a Canadian halal investor buys in this sector is an American name trading in New York or on Nasdaq, which means US withholding tax by account, US-dollar conversion, and a screen result that has to be checked in American filings. The rest of this guide takes the names in turn: the business gate, the subscription question, every screener result, the three names that fail on interest income, the one that fails on the business, and the checklist before buying.
One more framing point before the gates. A software stock is a share in a company, screened like any other stock: first its business, then its financial ratios. Nothing about the code changes the test. A company that sells design software and a company that sells customer databases face the identical two gates, and the results in the table below prove it: Adobe and Salesforce both pass, and three of their closest competitors fail. If the product decided the result, the table would look the other way around.
Gate one: is selling software a prohibited business?
Gate one asks a single question: does the company earn its money from a prohibited activity? The screen's list of prohibited businesses is short and familiar — alcohol, pork, gambling, tobacco, conventional banking and insurance, adult entertainment, weapons — and writing and selling software appears nowhere on it. A company that sells a word processor, a design tool, or a cloud platform is selling a tool, and a tool is not prohibited because of what a customer might do with it. That is why seventeen of the eighteen names in this guide clear gate one without difficulty, and why the gate-one discussion for software is mostly about the exceptions.
The exceptions matter because software companies do not stay in their lane. A software company that adds a lending product stops being purely a software company: Intuit's Credit Karma recommends credit cards and loans, and its QuickBooks Capital marketplace arranges financing, and that is the reason Intuit fails gate one even though its debt and income ratios both pass. A software company that sells to a military customer does not fail gate one — the screen tests the company's own business, not its customer list — but the site's moral screen reports those ties separately, and Microsoft, Palantir, Oracle and IBM all carry published findings there. The distinction is worth holding on to: gate one is about what the company sells, not who it sells to, and the moral screen is a separate, informational layer that never changes a PASS or a FAIL.
Two more gate-one edge cases recur in software. The first is advertising: a platform that earns money from advertising — Microsoft's search and LinkedIn advertising, for example — is not running a prohibited business, because advertising itself is not on the prohibited list, though individual scholars differ on advertising for prohibited products, and that disagreement is reported rather than settled here. The second is data: a company that sells data or analytics is selling information, not a prohibited product, and Palantir's government analytics work clears gate one on that basis — it fails later, at the income gate, not here. The pattern is consistent: software's gate-one questions are almost always about something the company added next to the software, not about the software itself.
The subscription question: is recurring revenue like interest?
This is the question every software investor asks first, and it has a short answer: no. A subscription is a payment for a service — access to software for a month or a year — and paying for a service on a recurring basis is not interest, which is a charge for the use of money itself. Microsoft's Azure, Salesforce's Sales Cloud and Adobe's Creative Cloud all sell access to a product. The customer pays, the product works, the payment stops when the access stops. Nothing is lent, nothing is borrowed, and no money is charged for the passage of time alone. The subscription model is the reason software companies are so profitable, and it is not the reason any of them fails the screen.
Where subscriptions do touch the screen is indirect, and it is the most important mechanism in this whole guide. A subscription business collects cash upfront — annual contracts paid in advance — and holds large balances while it delivers the service over the year. Those balances sit in money-market funds and marketable securities, and they earn interest. That interest income is exactly what the roughly 5% income gate measures: non-compliant income as a share of total revenue. A young software company with fast-growing revenue can carry a large cash pile and still stay under the ceiling, because the denominator is growing. A mature software company whose revenue growth has slowed, holding the same pile, can drift over it. That is the story of all three income-gate fails in this guide.
There is a second, subtler subscription effect: the ratios move with the market, not just with the business. The debt gate divides total debt by market capitalisation, so a falling share price pushes the ratio up without the company borrowing a dollar more. Oracle sits at 32.6% debt against a roughly 33% ceiling, and a bad quarter for the share price is all it takes to flip it. The income gate divides interest income by revenue, so a revenue slowdown pushes the ratio up without the company earning a dollar more interest. Snowflake sits at 4.07% interest income against a roughly 5% ceiling, and a slowdown is all it takes there. A PASS is a snapshot dated to the screening, not a permanent property of the company — and in software, where both gates are ratios with moving denominators, the snapshot ages faster than in most sectors.
What the screeners actually say: every software name on this site
Eighteen software and platform companies have been screened on this site, between September 28 and October 2, 2026, and the table below lists every one of them with the two ratios that decide the financial gates. Fourteen pass. Four fail. The debt column is interest-bearing debt as a share of market capitalisation, against a roughly 33% ceiling. The income column is non-compliant income — overwhelmingly interest income — as a share of revenue, against a roughly 5% ceiling. The cash gate, cash plus interest-bearing securities against a roughly 33% ceiling, is applied on each screener page and is not shown here; the four fails in this guide fail on the gates their pages state, not on cash.
| Company | Ticker | Result | Debt (% of market cap) | Non-compliant income (% of revenue) |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Microsoft | MSFT | PASS | 1.06% | 0.99% |
| Salesforce | CRM | PASS | 20.17% | 2.86% |
| Adobe | ADBE | PASS | 6.63% | 1.11% |
| Shopify | SHOP | PASS | Effectively zero | 2.86% |
| Oracle | ORCL | PASS | 32.6% | 1.16% |
| ServiceNow | NOW | PASS | 5.43% | 3.40% |
| Snowflake | SNOW | PASS | 1.96% | 4.07% |
| CrowdStrike | CRWD | PASS | 0.28% | 4.05% |
| Workday | WDAY | PASS | 6.64% | 1.77% |
| Accenture | ACN | PASS | 3.96% | 0.47% |
| Cognizant | CTSH | PASS | 5.36% | 0.37% |
| Autodesk | ADSK | PASS | 8.16% | 0.28% |
| Atlassian | TEAM | PASS | 2.22% | 1.06% |
| IBM | IBM | PASS | 29.29% | 1.04% |
| Palantir | PLTR | FAIL | 0.00% | 5.12% |
| Intuit | INTU | FAIL | 10.15% | 0.84% |
| Datadog | DDOG | FAIL | 0.99% | 5.67% |
| Airbnb | ABNB | FAIL | 2.11% | 5.76% |
Three things stand out in the table before any single company is discussed. First, debt is not the story in software: only two of the eighteen names carry debt above 20% of market capitalisation, and the three income-gate fails carry almost no debt at all — Palantir carries none. Software companies do not borrow the way industrial companies do, because they do not build factories; they collect subscriptions. Second, the income column is the story: the four highest income ratios in the table are the three fails plus Snowflake at 4.07%, and the gap between Snowflake and Datadog is 1.6 percentage points — the difference between a pass and a fail is a rounding error in a treasury department. Third, the passes are not a single profile. Microsoft passes at 1.06% debt and 0.99% income; Oracle passes at 32.6% debt; Snowflake passes at 4.07% income. The screen does not reward a type of company. It rewards two ratios, and software companies arrive at them by very different routes.
A note on what the table does not contain: the hardware names. Apple and Nvidia are covered in the AI and semiconductor guide — Apple passes at 1.98% debt and 0.0% non-compliant income, Nvidia passes at 0.15% debt and 1.07% income — because their businesses are hardware first, even though both sell software too. The line is a judgement call, and it is drawn where the revenue is: a company whose money comes mostly from selling devices is a hardware company that also sells software, not a software company. The same judgement puts Airbnb in this guide rather than in a travel guide: its money comes from a software platform's service fees, not from owning property, and its failure is a software-company failure — interest on a cash pile — not a hotel failure.
The interest-income pattern: how software fails
Three of the four fails in this guide fail the same way, and the pattern is worth understanding because it is the pattern most likely to catch the next software name too. A subscription business accumulates cash faster than it can deploy it, the cash earns interest, and the interest grows until it is more than roughly 5% of revenue. The business is fine. The balance sheet is fine. The treasury function is the problem — and the treasury function is part of the company being screened.
Palantir is the cleanest example. Its FY2025 interest income of $229.2M is about 5.12% of its $4,475.4M revenue — above the ceiling by a fraction of a point, on a company that carries no debt at all. The business gate passes: Palantir is a software and data-analytics company, and its government work does not change that. The debt gate passes trivially. The failure is a single number, and it is barely over the line — which is precisely why it matters. A fail by 0.12 points is still a fail, and the screen does not round down. Palantir's own screener page records the figures from its 10-K; the judgement is the threshold's, not the page's.
Datadog is the same pattern with a clearer paper trail. Its FY2025 interest income of $194.4M, earned on money-market funds and marketable securities per its 10-K, is about 5.67% of its $3,427.2M revenue — above the ceiling by more than half a point. Its debt is 0.99% of a roughly $99B market capitalisation, far under the ceiling. Datadog is a pure software company selling observability tools to developers, and nothing about the product raises a question. The interest is the whole story: a company that sells monitoring software and holds its customers' prepayments in securities that pay interest, until the interest is a twentieth of the business.
Airbnb is the largest of the three by the same measure. Its FY2025 interest income of $705M is about 5.76% of its $12.24B revenue — the highest income ratio in this guide — while its debt is 2.11% of a roughly $94.6B market capitalisation. Airbnb's business is a marketplace: it takes service fees on bookings rather than owning properties, and the marketplace model means it holds enormous guest prepayments between booking and stay, which earn interest in the meantime. Zoya and Musaffa both classify Airbnb as not Shariah-compliant, which corroborates the screen rather than deciding it — the site's own numbers fail the company on their own. Airbnb also carries a BDS listing as a pressure target, reported in the section below, which is separate from the screen result and does not change it.
The lesson of the three is not that software companies should hold less cash — cash is not the problem, and the cash gate is a separate test that all three pass. The lesson is that the income gate is the binding constraint on the sector, and it binds on the most successful subscription businesses, because success in subscriptions means cash in advance. An investor screening a software name that has not been screened yet should check the interest income line first, before the debt line: in this sector, that is where the fails live.
Intuit: the business-activity fail
Intuit is the one name in this guide where the ratios and the result disagree, and the disagreement is the point. Per its FY2026 10-K, Intuit's total debt of $7,669M is about 10.15% of its roughly $75.57B market capitalisation — below the roughly 33% ceiling — and its interest income of $180M is about 0.84% of FY2026 revenue of $21,448M, below the roughly 5% ceiling. On the numbers alone it would pass. It fails at gate one, business activity, and it fails there because of what the company has become rather than what it was.
Intuit reports two segments. Global Business Solutions, about 60% of FY2026 revenue, covers QuickBooks, the Intuit Enterprise Suite, Mailchimp, merchant payment processing — and QuickBooks Capital financing. The Consumer segment, about 40%, covers TurboTax, ProTax — and Credit Karma. Credit Karma is a personal finance marketplace whose offerings include personalised recommendations for credit cards, home, auto and personal loans, and insurance products. The company also offers financing through an originating bank partner and the QuickBooks Capital marketplace, plus checking and savings accounts through an FDIC-member bank partner. A tax-software company that recommends credit cards and arranges loans is, for screening purposes, partly a lending business — and lending is on the prohibited list. Musaffa classifies Intuit as NOT HALAL as of September 2026 under its AAOIFI methodology, which corroborates the gate-one finding.
Intuit is the cautionary tale for the whole sector, because it shows how a software company fails without borrowing too much or earning too much interest. The failure is not a ratio; it is a product decision, made one acquisition and one feature at a time. Credit Karma was an acquisition. QuickBooks Capital was a feature. Neither looked like a screening problem on the day it launched, and together they are the reason the company fails. Investors who hold Intuit for the tax software are holding the lending business too, and the screen does not let the investor choose which half counts. The remedy is the same as for any fail: the guide on what to do when a holding fails the screen walks through the options, and the passing names in the table above are the starting point for a replacement.
The borderline passes: Oracle, IBM, Snowflake, CrowdStrike
Four passing names sit close enough to a ceiling that a single quarter could move them, and they are worth naming individually because a PASS that is about to become a FAIL is the most expensive surprise in this sector. Oracle is the closest on debt: 32.6% of market capitalisation against a roughly 33% ceiling, with income of 1.16% — the debt gate is the whole story, and it is a story of acquisitions. Oracle has bought its way to scale for decades, and debt-funded deals are how it did it; the ratio is a legacy of that strategy, and it leaves almost no headroom. A falling share price, which shrinks the denominator, is all it takes. IBM is the same pattern at a slightly safer distance: 29.29% debt, 1.04% income, a company that has carried acquisition debt since the Red Hat purchase and never fully deleveraged. Both pass. Neither passes comfortably.
Snowflake and CrowdStrike are the mirror image: comfortable on debt, close on income. Snowflake's interest income is 4.07% of revenue against a roughly 5% ceiling, with debt of 1.96%; CrowdStrike's is 4.05%, with debt of 0.28%. Both are young, fast-growing subscription businesses holding large cash balances from prepaid contracts, and both are one revenue slowdown away from the line — because the income ratio divides interest by revenue, a slowdown raises the ratio without the company earning another dollar of interest. ServiceNow, at 3.40% income and 5.43% debt, is the next name in the same queue, and Salesforce at 2.86% income is further back. The borderline is not a prediction: these companies may grow their way out of it, and Snowflake in particular has revenue growth that could pull the ratio down as fast as it rose. But a PASS at 4.07% is a different holding from a PASS at 0.99%, and the investor who does not know which one they own has not finished the screen.
There is a discipline point here that applies to the whole table. The screen's thresholds are conventions — roughly 33% and roughly 5% — and scholars differ on the exact numbers and on whether market capitalisation or total assets is the right denominator. This site publishes its conventions on the methodology page and applies them consistently, so a borderline pass is a fact about the convention as much as about the company. An investor who follows a different threshold convention could draw a different line on Oracle or Snowflake, and that is a legitimate disagreement, not an error in either screen. What is not legitimate is not knowing where the line falls. The table above gives the numbers; the methodology page gives the convention; the investor supplies the judgement.
Shopify: the Canadian name
Shopify is the reason this guide has a Canadian section rather than a Canadian footnote. It is the only software company of global scale headquartered in Canada, it passes this site's screen as of September 2026, and it does so cleanly: its business is e-commerce software, its debt is effectively zero, and its interest income sits at 2.86% of revenue — under the roughly 5% ceiling. Zoya's screener independently rates Shopify Shariah-compliant. For a Canadian halal investor, that combination — a passing screen on a domestic company — is rare enough to be worth stating plainly: the biggest Canadian technology company is a passing name.
The practical advantages are as important as the screen result. Shopify trades in Toronto under the same SHOP ticker as on the NYSE, so a Canadian investor can buy it in Canadian dollars without a currency conversion or a US-dollar account. It pays no dividend, so there is no US withholding tax to think about and no dividend purification to calculate — the two frictions that dominate the rest of this guide simply do not apply. Compare that with Microsoft, which pays a dividend subject to 15% withholding inside a TFSA and treaty-exempt inside an RRSP, and which must be bought in US dollars unless the broker converts it. Shopify is not a better company because it is Canadian; it is a simpler holding because it is Canadian.
The caveats are real and should not be skipped. Shopify's interest income at 2.86% is more than halfway to the roughly 5% ceiling, which puts it in the same watch category as Salesforce at the same figure — a revenue slowdown or a larger cash balance could move it, and the re-screening discipline in the checklist below applies here as much as anywhere. And a single-company concentration is still a concentration: Shopify is one company in one sector, and a portfolio built on one passing name is not diversified because the name passes. The rebalancing guide and the asset-location guide cover the portfolio questions; this guide covers only the screen.
Microsoft passes — and carries a BDS listing
Microsoft is the largest passing name in this guide, and the one most investors will ask about first: it passes with debt of 1.06% of its market capitalisation and interest income of 0.99% of revenue, on a business — software and cloud services — that raises no gate-one question. It is also the name where the screen result and the rest of the site's reporting diverge most sharply, and the divergence is worth explaining, because it is the point of having separate screens.
Microsoft is listed as a boycott target on the BDS movement's published boycott guide, and its screener page carries that flag. Airbnb, which fails the screen on interest income, is also listed — as a pressure target, on the BDS movement's account because it lists rentals in Israeli settlements. No other software name in this guide carries a BDS listing. The BDS screen is informational: it records whether a company appears on the BDS movement's published lists, it is attributed to the BDS movement as the source, and it never changes a PASS or a FAIL. Microsoft passes the Shariah screen and carries a BDS boycott listing at the same time, and both statements are true at once because they measure different things.
The moral screen adds a further layer, also informational and also not affecting the result. Microsoft, Palantir, Oracle and IBM all carry published moral-screen findings on their screener pages: Microsoft's is sourced to Associated Press reporting on the use of Microsoft AI technology, Palantir's to Responsible Statecraft reporting on Bloomberg, Oracle's to a Pentagon software consolidation contract reported by Nextgov/FCW, and IBM's to Computer Weekly reporting. Salesforce, Adobe, Shopify, Intuit, Snowflake, ServiceNow, CrowdStrike, Datadog, Workday, Autodesk, Atlassian, Accenture and Cognizant carry no published moral-screen findings. The site's rule is that a finding publishes only with a named public source, and the default where there is none is "No findings published." An investor who treats the moral screen as decisive and an investor who ignores it will build different portfolios from the same PASS list, and that is a choice the site leaves to the investor, with the sources named so the choice can be made on evidence rather than on rumour.
Software ETFs: screen the holdings, not the label
Most Canadian investors will not buy eighteen individual software stocks. They will buy a fund, and the fund question is different from the stock question: a fund that calls itself a technology fund, or even a software fund, holds whatever its index holds, and the index does not apply a Shariah screen. The halal ETF comparison on this site covers the screened funds — SPUS, HLAL and WSHR — and the method for checking any other fund is the guide to screening a fund's holdings yourself: take the fund's holdings list, run each holding through the two gates, and weight the result. A fund that holds Microsoft, Salesforce and Adobe alongside Palantir, Datadog and Intuit is not a halal fund because most of its holdings pass; it is a fund with a known impure share, and the investor's job is to measure that share and decide what to do with it.
The software sector makes this exercise unusually tractable, because the holdings are concentrated. A broad technology fund's top ten holdings will usually include Microsoft, and often Apple and Nvidia as well — all three pass on this site. The fails hide further down the list: a fund that holds Palantir or Datadog at a 1% or 2% weight is carrying a small failing slice, and the question is whether the investor purifies, avoids, or accepts it — a question the purification guide answers for dividends and the fund-holdings guide answers for the holdings themselves. The worst outcome is not holding a failing name at a small weight; it is holding it without knowing it is there. The table in this guide is the checklist: any fund whose holdings list contains a name marked FAIL above is carrying that fail, whatever the fund's marketing says.
One more fund-level caution, specific to software: the sector's weight in broad-market funds has grown so large that a "diversified" index fund is now, in practice, a concentrated bet on a handful of software and platform companies. That is a portfolio-construction observation, not a screening result, and it is covered in the rebalancing guide. But it means the screen results in this guide do more work than they appear to: the same four or five passing names recur in almost every fund a Canadian investor is likely to own, and knowing that Microsoft passes and Palantir fails is knowing something about the fund, not just about the stock.
The Canadian investor's checklist
Before buying any software stock, run these five checks in order. First, the screen result on this site — or run the two gates yourself, using the methodology page, if the name has not been screened. The eighteen names above are the screened set; a software name outside it has no result yet, and an unscreened name is not a passing name. Second, the listing and the account: most software names in this guide are US-listed, which means 15% withholding tax on dividends inside a TFSA and treaty-exempt inside an RRSP — the asset-location guide works through the account choice — while Shopify, the Toronto-listed name, avoids the question entirely.
Third, purification. Several passing software names pay dividends — Microsoft, IBM, Oracle and Accenture all pay one — so a small impure share of each dividend needs purifying every year, using the purification guide and the purification calculator. The non-payers — Shopify, Adobe, Salesforce, ServiceNow, Snowflake, CrowdStrike, Workday, Atlassian, Autodesk and Datadog — carry no dividend purification at all, which is a genuine simplification, though it is not a reason to prefer them: a dividend is not a defect, and a non-payer is not automatically a better holding. Fourth, zakat: shares are zakatable wealth, and the zakat-on-stocks guide and the zakat calculator cover the calculation, which is separate from purification and must not be confused with it.
Fifth, and most important in this sector, re-screen before adding to a position. A PASS is dated to its screening — October 2026 for every name in this guide — and the two ratios that decide it move with the share price, the revenue, and the cash balance. Oracle at 32.6% debt and Snowflake at 4.07% income are the names where a single quarter could change the answer, and the site's own screeners are the place to check: each screener page carries its screening date and its figures, and a result that has changed will say so. The discipline is cheap and the surprise is expensive. Buy the screen result as it stands today, not as it stood when this guide was written.
What to watch next
Three things will move the software screen over the next year, and all three are worth watching rather than predicting. The first is the interest-income drift: the three fails in this guide all failed by less than a point over the ceiling, and the two closest passes — Snowflake at 4.07% and CrowdStrike at 4.05% — are within a point of it from the other side. If interest rates stay high and subscription revenue growth slows, the drift is toward more fails, not fewer, and the next screening round will show it first. The second is the debt ceiling: Oracle at 32.6% is one bad quarter for the share price away from failing, and any large debt-funded acquisition by a passing name — the pattern that failed Pfizer in the pharma guide — would test the same gate in software.
The third is the business gate, which is where Intuit failed and where the next surprise is most likely to come from. Software companies keep adding financial products — payments, lending, banking-as-a-service — because the margins are attractive and the distribution is already built. Each addition is a gate-one question, and each one is decided company by company, acquisition by acquisition. An investor who watches only the ratios will miss it; the business has to be watched too. The site's screeners are re-run as filings arrive, and the screener hub is where a changed result appears first. Software stocks, screened properly, are a broad opportunity: fourteen passing names, four failing ones whose failures are narrow or structural, and a field of unscreened names still to be checked. That breadth is itself the finding. A halal investor who wants software exposure can get it — through Microsoft or Shopify, with the BDS listing noted and purification planned on the dividend, or through any of the other twelve passing names — but the sector rewards the screen: the same theme, bought through Palantir instead of Microsoft, is a different investment entirely. Buy the screen result, not the theme.
FAQ
Are software stocks halal?
As a business activity, yes: writing and selling software is not on the list of prohibited businesses this site's screen applies, and seventeen of the eighteen names in this guide clear the business gate. Whether a specific software stock passes depends on the financial gates. Fourteen of the eighteen software and platform companies this site has screened pass — including Microsoft, Salesforce, Adobe and Shopify — while four fail: Palantir, Datadog and Airbnb on interest income above the roughly 5% ceiling, and Intuit on the business gate despite passing both financial ratios. This is a screening result, not a fatwa.
Why do Palantir, Datadog, and Airbnb fail when Microsoft passes?
The difference is not the software — it is the interest income sitting on top of it. Palantir's FY2025 interest income of $229.2M is about 5.12% of its $4,475.4M revenue, above the roughly 5% ceiling. Datadog's FY2025 interest income of $194.4M, earned on money-market funds and marketable securities per its 10-K, is about 5.67% of its $3,427.2M revenue. Airbnb's FY2025 interest income of $705M is about 5.76% of its $12.24B revenue. All three pass the debt gate comfortably — Palantir carries no debt at all — and all three clear the business gate. Microsoft, by contrast, earns interest income of 0.99% of revenue, far below the ceiling, with debt of 1.06% of its market capitalisation. Same industry, same gates, opposite results: the cash pile earning interest is what separates them.
Why does Intuit fail if its debt and income ratios pass?
Intuit is the one name in this guide where the ratios and the result disagree, and the disagreement is the point. Per its FY2026 10-K, Intuit's total debt of $7,669M is about 10.15% of its roughly $75.57B market capitalisation — below the roughly 33% ceiling — and its interest income of $180M is about 0.84% of FY2026 revenue, below the roughly 5% ceiling. On the numbers alone it would pass. But Intuit fails at gate one, business activity: its Credit Karma segment is a personal finance marketplace whose offerings include personalised recommendations for credit cards, home, auto and personal loans, and insurance products, and the company also offers financing through an originating bank partner and the QuickBooks Capital marketplace. Musaffa classifies Intuit as NOT HALAL as of September 2026 under its AAOIFI methodology. A company can pass every financial ratio and still fail the screen if the business itself is the problem.
Is a software subscription halal — is recurring billing like interest?
No, and the distinction is the whole point of the subscription question. A subscription is a payment for a service — access to software for a month or a year — and paying for a service in instalments or on a recurring basis is not interest, which is a charge for the use of money itself. Microsoft's Azure, Salesforce's Sales Cloud and Adobe's Creative Cloud all sell access to a product, and none of them raises a gate-one question on that account. The place subscriptions do touch the screen is indirect: a subscription business collects cash upfront, holds large balances, and earns interest on those balances — and that interest income is exactly what the roughly 5% income gate measures. Palantir, Datadog and Airbnb do not fail because they sell subscriptions. They fail because the interest their cash earns is more than roughly 5% of their revenue. Scholars differ on the precise thresholds and on how to treat mixed income, and this page reports the screen's conventions rather than settling that disagreement.
Is Shopify halal, and what should a Canadian investor know about buying it?
Yes, Shopify passes this site's Shariah screen as of September 2026: its business is e-commerce software, its debt is effectively zero, and its interest income sits at 2.86% of revenue — under the roughly 5% ceiling. Zoya's screener independently rates Shopify Shariah-compliant. For a Canadian investor, Shopify is also the practical exception in this guide: it is a Canadian company trading in Toronto under the same SHOP ticker as on the NYSE, so it can be bought in Canadian dollars without a currency conversion, and it pays no dividend, so there is no US withholding tax to think about and no dividend purification to calculate. The same cannot be said for the US names in this guide, which carry 15% withholding inside a TFSA and are treaty-exempt inside an RRSP. A PASS result is still a snapshot — Shopify's interest income at 2.86% is more than halfway to the ceiling, so re-screen before adding to a position.
What should a Canadian investor check before buying a software stock?
Four things. First, the screen result on this site — or run the two gates yourself if the name has not been screened. Second, the listing: most big software names are US-listed, while Shopify is the Canadian name trading in Toronto; US-listed names carry different withholding-tax treatment by account — 15% inside a TFSA, treaty-exempt inside an RRSP. Third, purification: several passing software names pay dividends — Microsoft, IBM, Oracle and Accenture all pay one — so a small impure share of each dividend needs purifying every year, while the non-payers like Shopify, Adobe and Salesforce carry no dividend purification at all. Fourth, re-screening: a PASS can turn FAIL when financials change, so check the screener again before adding to a position — Oracle, at 32.6% debt against a roughly 33% ceiling, and Snowflake, at 4.07% interest income against a roughly 5% ceiling, are the names where that matters most.